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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

)

Wally Kay Schultz,

SUPREME COURT NO. 42095-2014

Minidoka County Case CR2011-96

)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Appeal from the Fifth Judicial District, Minidoka County, Idaho

HONORABLE Michael R. Crabtree, presiding,

Sara Thomas, State Public Defender, 3050 Lake Harbor Ln. Ste. 100, Boise, Idaho 83703

Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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Case: CV-2011-0000096 Current Judge: Michael R. Crabtree
Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

1/21/2011

NCPC

JANET

New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief

JANET

Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings
Michael R. Crabtree
Paid by: Schultz #193761, Wally Kay (subject)
Receipt number: 0000648 Dated: 2/3/2011
Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: Schultz #193761, Wally
Kay (subject)

APPR

JANET

Defendant: State of Idaho Appearance Through
Attorney Lance D Stevenson

Michael R. Crabtree

DISQ

JANET

Disqualification Of Judge - Cause

Michael R. Crabtree

ANSW

JANET

Answer to successive post-conviction application Michael R. Crabtree

2/25/2011

MISC

JANET

Amended answer to successive post conviction
application

Michael R. Crabtree

3/30/2011

MISC

JANET

Successive Post-Conviction Brief

Michael R. Crabtree

10/3/2011

NOPD

JANET

Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued

Michael R. Crabtree

10/14/2011

MOTN

JANET

Motion to amend successive post-conviction brief Michael R. Crabtree

NOTC

JANET

Notice to retain case

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order to retain case

Michael R. Crabtree

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/12/2011 03:00
PM)

Michael R. Crabtree

JANET

Notice Of Hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

2/3/2011

11/3/2011

Judge
Michael R. Crabtree

11/4/2011

HRVC

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Michael R. Crabtree
12/12/2011 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
to Amend (Per the Court - hrg was not requested)

11/21/2011

ORDR

JANET

Order granting the petitioner's motion to amend
successive post-conviction brief

Michael R. Crabtree

11/22/2011

MEMO

JANET

Memorandum (Pro Se)

Michael R. Crabtree

MISC

JANET

Objection to motion to amend successive
post-conviction brief

Michael R. Crabtree

1/27/2012

MOTN

JANET

Motion and affidavit in support for appointment of Michael R. Crabtree
counsel

1/30/2012

ORDR

JANET

Order modifying deadline for amended pleadings Michael R. Crabtree

1/31/2012

MISC

JANET

Successive Post-Conviction amendments under
19-4908

Michael R. Crabtree

2/1/2012

ORPD

JANET

Subject: Schultz #193761, Wally Kay Order
Appointing Public Defender Court appointed
Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

MISC

JANET

Rcvd from petitioner (exhibits)

Michael R. Crabtree

MISC

JANET

Rcvd from petitioner (exhibits)

Michael R. Crabtree

ORPD

JANET

Order Appointing Public Defender - Steven
Macrae

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Motion to consolidate post-conviction proceedings Michael R. Crabtree
(with CV-2011-662)

2/7/2012
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Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Wally Kay Schultz, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

2/9/2012

ORDR

JANET

Minute Order regarding the Petitioner's pro se
Michael R. Crabtree
motion to consolidate post-conviction proceedings

2/16/2012

ANSW

JANET

Answer to successive post-conviction
amendments

Michael R Crabtree

MISC

JANET

Objection to consolidate post-conviction
proceedings

Michael R. Crabtree

AMCO

JANET

Verified amended successive petition for
post-conviction relief

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Motion to amend successive petition for
post-conviction relief

Michael R. Crabtree

NOTC

JANET

Notice of seivice

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

SANTOS

ExParte Motion for Payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

SANTOS

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

3/23/2012

ORDR

SANTOS

Order for Payment $1232.00

Michael R. Crabtree

5/29/2012

ORDR

JANET

Order granting the petitioner's motion to amend
successive petition for post-conviction relief

Michael R. Crabtree

6/6/2012

MOTN

JANET

Ex parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

6/7/2012

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($82. 50)

Michael R. Crabtree

7/19/2012

MOTN

JANET

Motion for summary dismissal of successive post Michael R. Crabtree
conviction and brief in support

7/20/2012

ORDR

JANET

Scheduling order regarding the State's motion for Michael R. Crabtree
summary dismissal

8/6/2012

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

8/7/2012

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($159.50)

Michael R. Crabtree

8/16/2012

MISC

JANET

Petitioner's brief in opposition to State's motion
for summary dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

8/30/2012

MISC

JANET

State's reply to petitioner's brief in opposition to
state's motion for summary dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

9/5/2012

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($407.00)

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order granting the state's motion for summary
dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

JDMT

JANET

Judgment

Michael R. Crabtree

CDIS

JANET

Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho,
Michael R. Crabtree
Defendant; Schultz #193761, Wally Kay, Subject.
Filing date: 9/13/2012

APSC

JANET

Appealed To The Supreme Court - Notice of
Appeal

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Motion for appointment of state appellate public
defender

Michael R Crabtree
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Date

Code

User

9/28/2012

ORDR

JANET

Notice and Order for appointment of State
appellate public defender

Michael R. Crabtree

10/2/2012

MOTN

SANTOS

ExParte Motion for Payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

SANTOS

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($236.50)

Michael R. Crabtree

MISC

SANTOS

Clerk's Certificate of Appeal filed

Michael R. Crabtree

11/13/2012

MISC

SANTOS

Acknowledgment of Service by Respondent
Counsel

Michael R. Crabtree

11/15/2012

MISC

SANTOS

Acknowledgment of Service by Appellant
Counsel

Michael R. Crabtree

11/20/2012

NOTC

JANET

Notice of attorney change of contact information

Michael R. Crabtree

7/31/2013

OPIN

SANTOS

Unpublished Opinion and Shall Not Be Cited as
Authority

Michael R. Crabtree

8/27/2013

REMT

SANTOS

Remittitur

Michael R. Crabtree

9/5/2013

NOTC

JANET

Notice of intent to dismiss post-conviction
application

Michael R. Crabtree

9/6/2013

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

9/9/2013

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($126.50 to McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

9/25/2013

MOTN

JANET

Motion to amend successive petition for
Michael R. Crabtree
post-conviction relief and reply to Notice of Intent
to Dismiss

10/2/2013

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/28/2013 01:30
PM) Hearing on Court's Notice of intent to
dismiss and Petitioner's motion to amend
successive petition

10/11/2012

Judge

Michael R. Crabtree

JANET

Notice Of Hearing

Michael R Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

10/7/2013

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment $506.00 to Steve McRae

Michael R Crabtree

10/28/2013

CMIN

JANET

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 10/28/2013
Time: 1:46 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland
Tape Number:
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson
Party: Wally Schultz #193761, Attorney: Steven
McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ADVS

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
10/28/2013 01 30 PM: Case Taken Under
Advisement

Michael R Crabtree
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Date

Code

User

Judge

10/31/2013

ORDR

JANET

Order regarding the Court's notice of intent to
dismiss and the Petitioner's motion to amend
successive petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Michael R. Crabtree

11/5/2013

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($330.00 to Steven McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

11/6/2013

PETN

JANET

Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for Michael R. Crabtree
Post-Conviction Relief

11/26/2013

ANSW

JANET

Answer to second verified amended successive
petition for post conviction relief

Michael R. Crabtree

12/6/2013

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 01/17/2014
01 :30 PM) Post-Conviction Trial

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. Mcrae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($99.00 to McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

12/12/2013

MOTN

LAURIE

Motion for Summary dismissal and Brief in
Support

Michael R. Crabtree

1/2/2014

MISC

JANET

Petitioner's response to Respondent's Motion for
summary judgment

Michael R. Crabtree

1/3/2014

ORDR

JANET

Order vacating Court Trial and notice of hearing
on the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

HRVC

JANET

Hearing result for Court Trial scheduled on
01/17/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated
Post-Conviction Trial

Michael R. Crabtree

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/17/2014 01:30
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Ex-parte motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

1/6/2014

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($423.50 to Steven McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

1/7/2014

MISC

JANET

Reply to petitioner's response to State's motion
for summary dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

1/10/2014

STIP

JANET

Stipulation to vacate hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

1/13/2014

ORDR

JANET

Order to vacate hearing (and note of hrg)

Michael R. Crabtree

HRVC

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Michael R. Crabtree
01/17/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
for Summary Dismissal

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/07/2014 01 :30
PM) Motion for Summary Dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

1/27/2014

CONT

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/07/2014 01:30 PM: Continued Motion for
Summary Dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

1/29/2014

MISC

JANET

Petitioner's response to respondent's additional
basis for summary judgment

Michael R. Crabtree
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Date

Code

User

1/31/2014

MOTN

JANET

Motion to continue hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order to continue hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

CONT

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
02/07/2014 01:30 PM: Continued Motion for
summary dismissal

Michael R. Crabtree

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/21/2014 01 :30
PM)

Michael R. Crabtree

JANET

Notice Of Hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for Payment (Conflict PD) ($462 to Steve
McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

NOTC

JANET

Notice of intent to dismiss post-conviction
application and order vacating hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

HRVC

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Michael R. Crabtree
03/21/2014 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
for Summary Dismissal

MOTN

JANET

Ex-Parte Motion for payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

JANET

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order for payment ($115. 50)

John K. Butler

3/11/2014

MISC

JANET

Petitioner's reply to notice of intent to dismiss

Michael R. Crabtree

3/12/2014

HRSC

JANET

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/07/2014 01 :30
PM) Petitioner's response to Court's notice of
intent to dismiss

Michael R. Crabtree

JANET

Notice Of Hearing

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

LAURIE

Ex Parte Motion for Payment

Michael R. Crabtree

AFFD

LAURIE

Affidavit of Steven R. McRae

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

LAURIE

Order for Payment ($291.50 to Steve McRae)

Michael R. Crabtree

CMIN

JANET

Court Minutes
Michael R. Crabtree
Hearing type: Motion
Hearing date: 4/7/2014
Time: 1:42 pm
Courtroom: District Courtroom-1
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Janet Sunderland
Tape Number:
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Lance Stevenson
Party: Wally Schultz, Attorney: Steven McRae

ADVS

JANET

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
04/07/2014 01 :30 PM: Case Taken Under
Advisement

Michael R. Crabtree

ORDR

JANET

Order dismissing post-conviction application

Michael R. Crabtree

JDMT

JANET

Judgment

Michael R. Crabtree

2/5/2014

2/27/2014

3/6/2014

4/4/2014

4/7/2014

4/9/2014

Judge
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Code
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4/23/2014

APSC

JANET

Appealed To The Supreme Court - Notice of
Appeal

Michael R. Crabtree

MOTN

JANET

Motion for appointment of state appellate public
defender

Michael R. Crabtree

Judge
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IN THE DISlRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,

Case No. CV-2011-96

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

NOTICE OF INTENT TO
DISMISS POST-CONVICTION
APPLICATION

Respondent.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz") was found guilty after
trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005-1139. He pied guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County
case CR-2005-884. On December 15, 2005, the court sentenced Mr. Schultz and retained
jurisdiction in both cases. Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed
Mr. Schultz on probation in both cases pursuant to Temporary Orders on Rider Review,
entered May 22, 2006. On May 25, 2006, the court entered formal Orders upon 180 Day
Review Hearing.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION

CV-2011-96

Page I
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Mr. Schultz filed an appeal in both cases on July 6, 2006, fortyfive days after the
entry of the Temporary Orders on Rider Review and forty-two
days after the entry of the
Orders upon 180 Day Review Hearing. 1 On appeal, the State
argued that the forty-two
day timeframe for filing an appeal began to run when the court
entered the Temporary
Orders on Rider Review. On that basis, the State argued that
the appeals were untimely
and should be dismissed.
On January 13, 2009, after the State filed its brief on appeal,
Mr. Schultz filed a
post-conviction case, Minidoka County case CV-2009-4 7, regard
ing the drug -possession

- ----- -- -· ·

case, CR-2005-884. He alleged that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel,
although he did not specifically allege that his attorney failed
to file a timely appeal. He
received appointed counsel. On February 20, 2009, Mr. Schul
tz filed a pro se document
entitled "Ammendment [sic] to Post-Conviction," attempting
to raise an additional claim
on post-conviction that his attorney in the underlying crimin
al cases, David Pena
(hereafter "Mr. Pena"), had failed to file a timely appeal.
On March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction case,
Minidoka County
case CV-2009-221, regarding the domestic battery case, CR-20
05-1139. He alleged that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel from Mr. Pena,
but he did not specifically
allege that Mr. Pena failed to file a timely appeal. He received

appointed counsel.

On May 29, 2009, the Idaho Court of Appeals dismissed Mr.
Schul tz's direct
appeal because it was untimely filed. See State v. Schultz, 147
Idaho 675, 214 P.3d 661
(Ct.App.2009). The remittitur was issued on August 27, 2009.

Schultz subsequently violated his probation. On August 13, 2007, the
court revoked his probation
and committed him to the custody ofth.e Idaho Department of Correc
tion to serve h.is sentences.
1 Mr.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLIC

ATION
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The State subsequently filed Motions to Dismiss in both post-conviction cases,
arguing that Mr. Schultz's petitions bad been filed outside the one-year statute of
limitations provided in Idaho Code § I9-4902(a). The statute of limitations for Mr.
Schultz's post-conviction actions began to run when the time for direct appeal expired on
July 3, 2006, forty-two days after the trial court entered its Temporary Orders on Rider
Review. It expired on July 3, 2007. Mr. Schultz filed a pro se supplemental brief in both
of his post-conviction cases, arguing that Mr. Pena failed to file timely appeals in the
underlying criminal cases..

On January 8, 2010, the trial court entered orders in both post-conviction cases
granting the State's Motions to Dismiss. Mr. Schultz appealed. On May 9, 2011, the
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Mr. Schultz's postconviction petitions for being untimely filed. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 256
P.3d 791 (CtApp.2011).
On January 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-conviction petition in
this case. On March 19, 2012, he filed a Verified Amended Successive Petition for PostConviction Relief. On July 19, 2012, the State filed a "Motion for Summary Dismissal of
Successive Post-Conviction [sic] and Brief in Support." The court entered an Order
Granting the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal on September 13, 2012.

Mr. Schultz filed an appeal. On July 31, 2013, the Idaho Court of Appeals issued
an unpublished opinion in which it reversed the court's Order Granting the State's
Motion for Summary Dismissal on the basis that this court dismissed Mr. Schultz's
petition on grounds for which no notice was given. The case was remanded for further

proceedings. The remittitur was issued on August 23, 2013.
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The court hereby gives notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's
Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.

DISCUSSION
In the Verified Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz raises two categories of
claims for post-conviction relief: (1) he contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel from his court-appointed attorney, Clayne Zollinger (hereafter "Mr. Z.Ollinger"),
in his prior post-conviction cases CV-2009-47 and CV-2009-221; and (2) he contends
that, based on newly discovered information regarding. the.--misconduct of forensic ·
scientists at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory, his due process rights and his
confrontation rights were violated in the underlying criminal case, CR-2005-884.
When a court is satisfied that a post-conviction applicant "is not entitled to postconviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing."

I.C. § 19-4906(b). The court intends to dismiss Mr. Schultz's application for postconviction relief for the following reasons: (1) Mr. Schultz's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel regarding Mr. Zollinger do not constitute legally cognizable claims
for post-conviction relief; and (2) Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prirna facie case for
post-conviction relief on his claims regarding misconduct at the Idaho State Police
Forensic Laboratory.

1.

Claims regarding ineffective assistance of post-eonvietion counsel.
Mr. Schultz contends that Mr. Zollinger, his attorney in his prior post-conviction

cases, provided ineffective assistance of counsel by: (1) failing to contact Mr. Pena to
secme information that Mr. Schultz requested Mr. Pena file an appeal on December 12,
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2005; (2) failing to contact Mr. Schultz 's appellate counsel to secure an
affidavit or
information regarding the events of Mr. Schultz 's direct appeal in the underly
ing criminal
cases; (3) failing to make the arguments contained in Mr. Schultz's Supplemental
Brief in
Support of Post-Conviction Relief; (4) failing to distinguish the facts of Mr.
Schultz 's
case from the facts set forth in Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1, 56 P.3d 158 (Ct.App
.2002);
(5) failing to argue effectively that Mr. Schultz was ''wronged" by Mr.
Pena in the
underlying criminal cases; and (6) failing to argue effectively in opposition to
the State's
motions to dismiss in the two prior post-conviction cases.

An applicant for post-conviction relief does not have a constitutional or statutor
y
right to effective assistance of post-conviction counsel. Rios-Lopez v. State,
144 Idaho
340, 343, 160 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct.App.2007). For this reason, a claim of
ineffective
assistance of post-conviction counsel may not be brought in a subsequent post-co
nviction
case. Id. Standing alone, such a claim does not provide grounds for post-convictio
n relief.

Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438,44 1, 128 P.3d 975, 978 (Ct.App.2006).
The ineffectiveness of prior post-conviction counsel may provide sufficie
nt
reason to permit an applicant for post-conviction relief to raise grounds for
relief that
were adjudicated or waived in a prior proceeding. Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441,
128 P .3d at
978. Idaho Code § 19-4908 provides that all grounds for post-conviction relief
available
to a post-conviction application must be raised in the original, supplemental
or amended
application. Any claim that has been finally adjudicated, not raised, or waived
in the prior
proceeding may not be raised in a subsequent post-conviction application
"unless the
court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asserted or
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application."
J.C. § 19-
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4908. "[A]n allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first postconviction action due to the deficiency of prior post-conviction counsel. if true, provides
sufficient reason to permit the claims to be presented again in a subsequent petition."

Griffin, 142 Idaho at 441, 128 P.3d at 978 (italics added).
In this case, Mr. Schultz has asserted claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
only against Mr. Zollinger, his attorney in the two prior post-conviction cases. Although
Mr. Schultz's assertions regarding Mr. Zollinger's performance might have provided a
sufficient reason to permit Mr. Schultz to assert certain. claims regarding Mr. Pena·'s
performance in the underlying criminal cases, Mr. Schultz has not raised any claims of
ineffective assistance of cowisel regarding Mr. Pena in this post-conviction case.
Therefore, these claims regarding Mr. Zollinger, standing alone, do not constitute legally
cognizable claims for post-conviction retie£

2.

Claims regarding misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory.
Between 2003 and 2011, several forensic scientists allegedly maintained an

unauthorized box of controlled substances at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory

in Pocatello, Idaho. The controlled substances in the box were not subject to
documentation, tracking, or auditing. Although there is no indication that this conduct
had any effect on the accuracy and reliability of the forensic testing of controlled
substances in the laboratory, it allegedly violated the terms of the Forensics Quality
Manual and other internal laboratory policies. This information was discovered and
provided to Mr. Schultz in 2011. For ease of reference, this information will be referred

to hereafter as "the subject information."
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Mr. Schultz contends that he could have used the subject information at trial
to
impeac h the credibility of Skyler Anderson (hereafter "Mr. Anderson"),
the forensic
scientist that performed the testing on the controlled substance in the underly
ing criminal
case, CR-2005-884. Mr. Schultz claims that the prosecution failed to
disclose this
information, and thereby violated his due process rights under the
Fourteenth
Amend ment, pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and his
confrontation
right under the Sixth Amendment. See I.C. § 19-4901 (1 ). He also appears
to be arguing
that the subject information constitutes newly discovered evidence that require
s vacation
of the convict ion or sentence in the interest of justice. See I.C. § 19-4901 (4).
These issues
will be addressed separately below.

a.

Alleged Brady violation

In a criminal case, the State is required "to disclose to the defense prior to trial
all

material exculpatory and impeachment evidence known to the state or in its possess
ion."
Roeder v. State, 144 Idaho 415, 162 P.3d 794 (Ct.App.2007) (citing Brady v. Maryla
nd,
373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)) (emphasis in original).
The elements
of a Brady due process violation are as follows: (1) "The evidence at issue
must be
favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching";
(2) "that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either
willfully or
inadvertently"; and (3) "prejudice must have ensued." State v. Shackelford,
150 Idaho
355, 380, 247 P.3d 582, 607 (2010) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S.
263, 281-82
(1999)).
Impeac hment evidence "is special in relation to the fairness of a trial not
in
respect to whethe r a plea is voluntary." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106
P.3d 376,
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390 (2004) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002)) (emphasis in
original). Therefore, where a defendant pleads guilty, ''the United States Constitution
does not require the State to disclose material impeachment information prior to entering
a plea agreement with the defendant." Roeder, 144 Idaho at 418, 162 P.3d at 797 (quoting
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 64, 106 P.3d at 390) (emphasis added).
The undisputed facts are that Mr. Schultz pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
and the underlying criminal case never proceeded to trial. The evidence regarding
misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory .is impeachment evidence, not
exculpatory evidence.2 Therefore, even assuming the State was aware of or had
possession of the subject information while the underlying criminal case was pending, it
had no constitutional obligation to disclose this evidence prior to entering into a plea
agreement with Mr. Schultz. Where there would have been no obligation to disclose, it
cannot be said that the State wrongfully suppressed the evidence under the second
element of a Brady due process violation set forth above.

Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prima facie case on all of the elements of a
Brady due process violation in his post-conviction petition.

b.

Alleged violation of Mr. Schultz's confrontation rights

Pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment, a criminal

defendant has the right ..to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST.

Mr. Schultz bas taken the position that he could have used the subject information to impeach Mr.
Anderson. He has not argued that it is exculpatory evidence. Exculpatory evidence ''tends to clear an
accused ofa11eged guilt, excuses the actions of the accused, or tends to reduce punishment." Baker v. State,
142 Idaho 411,422, 128 P.3d 948,959 (Ct.App.2005). Mr. Schultz has presented no evidence to show that
Mr. Anderson's misconduct at the laboratory had any effect on the accuracy of the test results in the
underlying criminal case. The subject information may have been used by the defense as impeachment
evidence against Mr. Anderson, but it does not tend to negate Mr. Schultz's guilt, excuse his actions, or
reduce his culpability. Therefore, it is not exculpatory evidence.
2
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amend. VI. "Before trial, the Confrontation Clause does not
compel pretrial discovery,
which may aid in effective cross-examination." State v. Davis
, 152 Idaho 652, 273 P.3d
693, 696 (Ct.App.2011). Further, a defendant's plea of guilty
waives the confrontation
right. See State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97, 156 P.3d 1193, 1195
(2007).

Mr. Schultz's claim that his confrontation rights were violated
is bare and
conclusory. This case never proceeded to trial. Mr. Schultz's confro
ntation rights did not
compel pretrial discovery of information that would aid in effect

ive cross-examination of

Mr. Anderson. Further, Mr. Schultz waived his right to be confro
nted by the witnesses
against him when he pied guilty. He has not alleged that this waive
r was invalid.
Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a prim.a facie case on his claim
of a violation of
his confrontation rights in his post-conviction petition.
c.

Newly discovered evidence

When a petitioner includes a claim in a post-conviction petition

based on evidence

of material facts not previously presented, the court exami
nes the claim under the
standard for a motion for new trial subsequent to a jury verdic
t. Rodgers v. State, 129
Idaho 720, 723, 932 P.2d 348, 351 (1997). A new trial based
on the ground of newly
discovered evidence is warranted only where the defendant shows
: "(1) the evidence is
newly discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time
of trial; (2) the evidence
is material, not merely cumulative or impeaching; (3) it will
probably produce an
acquittal; and (4) failure to learn of the evidence was not due to
a lack of diligence on the
part of the defendant." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 144,
191 P.3d 217, 222 (2008)
(citing State v. Drapeau, 97 Idaho 685, 691, 551 P.2d 972, 978
(1976)).
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Mr. Schul tz's request for a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is bare,
conclusory, and unsupported by admissible evidence. Even assum
ing that Mr. Schultz has
met his burde n on (1) and (4) above, he has not shown that
the subject information is
anything other than impeachment evidence. Further, Mr. Schul
tz has failed to produce
admissible evidence showing that the subject information would
probably produce an
acquittal. While it might have been used to challenge Mr.
Ander son's veracity as a
witness at trial, it does not directly challenge the accuracy of
the results of his forensic
testing. The subject information does not reduce or negate
Mr. Schul tz's culpability.
Simpl y stating that the subject information would probably produ
ce an acquittal, without
any evidence to support such a claim, is insufficient to support
a post-conviction claim.
Mr. Schultz has failed to set forth a pritna facie case on all
of the elements of a
claim for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in his

post-conviction petition.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court
is satisfied that Mr.
Schul tz is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that there
would be no purpose served
by further proceedings. The court gives notice that it intend
s to dismiss Mr. Schul tz's
Verified Amen ded Successive Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief. Mr. Schultz has
twenty (20) days to reply as set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906(b
).

3

0~
~·~- =--- =:::: ::::: ::;,- -""? 4~~ ~
It is so ORDERED this _ _
day of August, 2013.

MICHAEL R. CRAB TREE
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

j
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of

2013, I served a true,

correct copy of the NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION
upon the following in the manner provided:

Lance Stevenson
Minidoka County Prosecutor
P. 0. Box 368
Rupert, ID 83350
lstevenson@co.minidoka.id. us

( ) First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket
fy) Email

Steven R. McRae
P. 0. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com

( ) First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket
~Email
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Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2011-96

MOTION TO AMEND SUCCESSIVE
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF AND REPLY TO NOTICE OF
INTENT TO DISMISS

)

Respondent.

)

COMES NOW. Petitioner. Wally Kay Schultz, by and through his attomey of record,

Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and seeks leave to amend the Petitioner's
Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief as contained in the Second Verified Amended

Successive Petition for Post Conviction Relief(the "Verified Petition"). which is attached hereto

Petitioner seeks to make the amendment to the Petitioner's successive post-conviction
petition following the Court's recent Notice ofIntent to Dismiss PostuConviction Application
filed September 5, 2013(the "Notice oflntent"). As this Court is aware, Pursuant to Idaho Code

§ 19-4906(b), a Court can, by its own volition, dismiss a post-conviction petition. which the
MOTION TO AMEND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF AND REPLY TO
NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS • 1 -
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Court has done in this matter with the Notice ofintcnt. However, in order to do so, the Court
must grant the post-conviction petitioner "an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed
dismissal.", also which this Court has done in the Notice oflntent. Id.
In Garza v. S1a1e. 139 Idaho 533, 537. 82 P.3d 445,449 (Idaho 2003), the Idaho Supreme

Court stated that the purpose of the 20 day reply period is to allow the Petitioner an opportunity
to submit an amended petition to cure deficiencies in the petition, if possible. "It appears that

thae legislators 'Viewed the 20-day reply period as tm opportunity to submit gn amended
application, not as a requirement to receiving n ruling on the merits of an application." Garza
v. State, 139 Idaho 533,537, 82 P.3d 445,449 (Idaho 2003) (emphasis added).
In the present matter, the Court has shown in Count One of the Verified Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief that the Petitioner had a deficiency in his pleading in failing
to allege that David Pena•s performance in the underlying criminal case was ineffective.

Petitioner now seeks to amend the petition - and Count One only- so as to remedy this
deficiency in Petitioner• s prior petition as was explained in the Notice of Intent.
Furthermore, Petitioner requests that this Motion be treated as an answer to the Court's
Notice of Intent and allow the Petitioner to proceed - with the cured petition for post-conviction
relief - pursuant to Idaho Code § I 9-4906(b).
In the event that there is an objection to this Motion to Amend Successive Petition for
Post Conviction Relief, Petitioner requests a hearing on all issues.
DATED this 251h day of September, 2012.

~~~-

B y ~

Steven R. McRae
Attorneys for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE or SERVICE
· Steven R. McRae. a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the
2s"' day of September. 2013. he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
document upon the following:

Lance Stevenson
Prosecuting Attorney for
the County of Minidoka
P.O.Box368

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
P<.,]

U.S. Mail. postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Rupert, ID 833SO

Steven R. McRae
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Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
181 5tt1 Ave. South, ste. 100
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MaglcValleyLegal.com
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
I

IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

.

WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,
..

Petitioner,

vs.

)
)
)
)
)

)
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV-2011-96

VERIFIED AMENDED SUCCESSIVE
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF

)
)
)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, wany Kay Schultz, by and through his attorney of
record, Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and submits this Amended
Petition for Post Conviction Relief.
Petitioner alleges:

1.

The Petitioner Is currently detained in the Idaho Correctlonal Center.

2.

The under1ylng offenses In this matter are from Minidoka cases CR-2005--

884 (the "Drug Caaen) and CR-2005-1139 (the •eattery Case"). Convictions in these

..I-----.
A

matters occurred in the Fifth Judicial District of Minidoka County, Rupert, Idaho.

EXHIBrT
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both of these cases into one post-conviction case for the purposes of expediency and judicial
economy and because the claim of Count One as contained herein is the same for both cases.
3.

In the Drug Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of

Possession ofa Controlled Substance. LC.§ 37-2732(C)(l). Sentence was imposed on

December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate period of ioouceration of
3 years and an indetenninate period of incarceration of 4 years.
4.

In the Battery Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of

Battery, LC.§ 18-903. Sentence was imposed on December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was
sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration of 5 years and an indeterminate period of

incarceration of 5 years.
5.

Petitioner sought post conviction relief in each of the Drug Case and the Battery

Case in Minidoka County Case Nos. CV-2009-221 and CV-2009-47, respectively (the "Original
Post Conviction Cases"). ln both of the Original Post Conviction Cases, Petitioner was
represented by counsel, Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr. ("ZOllinger"). In the Original Post Conviction
Cases, the Court filed an Order on January 8, 2010 granting the State's Motion to Dismiss both
cases. The primary issue in both of the Originai Post Conviction Cases was that Petitioner's
underlying counsel in both the Battery Case and the Drug Case was ineffective as counsel when
he missed a deadline for filing an appeal in both of the cases.
COUNT ONE

Reassertion of Claims Pursuant to Palmer v. Dermitt
6.

Petitioner reasserts via Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 ldaho 591 (Idaho 1981), his claim

for post-conviction relief because of the ineffective assistance of his underlying criminal counsel,
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..........

David Pena. as asserted in his Original Post-Conviction Cases, and specifically that David Pena
filed PetitiOllel"s appeal late after being advised by Petitioner that he wished to file an appeal.
7.

Pursuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count One of

this matter based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Zollinger. in his Original Post Conviction
Cases. Specifically, Petitioner alleges:

a.

In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases. Zollinger failed to contact

Petitioner's underlying criminal attorney, David Pena. to secure infonnalion that Petitioner

requested Mr. Pena to file an appeal on December 12, 2005. Attached hereto as Exhibit A-A is
a true and correct letter from the Idaho State Bar. which shows information Zollinger failed to
obtain.

b.

In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, l.ollinger failed to contact

Petitioner's appellate counsel to secure an affidavit or infonnation -&om Erik R. Lehtinen as to
the events of Petitioner's direct appeal in the underlying cases. Attached hereto as Exhibit B-,..B
is a true and correct copy of an Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen, which shows the infonnation that
Zollinger failed to obtain.

c.

Zollinger failed to argue information u contmncd in Petitioner's

Supplemental Brief in Support of Post Conviction Relief. a true and correct copy of which is

attached hereto as ~hibit C-C;

d.

Zollinger failed to argue distinguishing facts of Petitioner's case from

Loman Y, State. 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002): namely. that in Loman, the defendant was
placed on notice within his post-conviction tirneline by the Idaho Supreme Court that the
defendant•s appeal was untimely filed. when in Petitioner's case, Petitioner had no such notice
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that his appeal was untimely filed. but instead learned that his appeal was untimely filed only

after the time for filing his post-conviction had run.
e.

Had Zollinger rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's counsel, by

completing the acts as stated above, Zollinger would have been able to effectively argue that

Petitioner was wronged by bis counsel, David Pena, in his underlying criminal cases and would
have effectively argued against the State's Motion to Dismiss in the Original Post Conviction
Cases.

COUNTTWO
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
8.

Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief for the 0mg Case in this Count Two of this

matter based 'd@bo Code§ 19-4901(4). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that there: exists evidence
of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction of
sentence in the interest of justice, as follows:

a.

That the State in the Drug Case withheld and suppressed (whether

inadvertently or not) information that was favorable to Petitioner's defense, thereby creating a
Brady/Giglio scenario. The infonnation that was specifically withheld and suppressed was that
several employees, including several forensic experts who testify in court proceedings on a
regular basis. over a period of several years from 2003 or earlier, to 2011, conspired to maintain

an ongoing unauthorized quantity of controlled :!lubstances and other chemicals outside the
practices of the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking or auditing.
Furthermore, said employees hid said narcotics and chemicals from auditors with the intent to

deceive.
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b.

A true and correct copy of a letter from a group of prosecutors in the State

ofldaho to members of the Idaho Bar was filed on February 1, 2012, which contains an
Administrative Investigation Report by the Idaho State Police, was filed by Petitioner on
February 1, 2012 as Exhibit XYZ.

c.

It is Petitioner's position that because of the actions of the above-

described employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory in this case, Petitioner was
prohibited frotn providing a defense in his case that might otherwise be available to him.

Specifically, Petitioner was prohibited from engaging in appropriate cross-examination of Skylar
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory policies and procedures in
order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity for truthfulness, all in
violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amerubnent Constitutional Rights to confront all witnesses
against him.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief to which Petitioner may be entitled in this
proceeding, includin& but not limited to the following:
L

That Petitioner be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Drug Case and have
a trial in the Drug Case, 'Whereby he would have the opportunity to cross-examine

Skylar Anderson.
2.

That the Petitioner be allowed to re-file his Original Post-Conviction Cases and

argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss.
The Petitioner further states that the entirety of his claim for successive post conviction
relief in this case are contained herein. Specifically. Petitioner withdraws any claim for newly
discovered evidence as it relates to the Drug Case and Laurie Elizabeth Freitag, a.k.a. Laurie

Morrill.
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DATED this ~ f September, ;013.

McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
By:~···

Steven R. McRae
Attorneys for Petitioner
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STATE OF IDAHO
County or--:t"i,u\,,~O,o

)
)ss.
)

Wally Schultz, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
That he has read the foregoing Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction

Relief, knows the contents thereof, and that the same is true

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~ a y of September. 2013.

NOTAR ~UBLIC FOR ID}\110
Residing at:~ M)1\1 ..& £i\.
Commission~pires: ,\

f\\ 16"
\

CERTIFICATE or SERVICE

Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the
'2h,y of September, 2013, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
document upon the following:
Lance Stevenson

Prosecuting Attorney for
the County of Minidoka
P.O. BoxJ68

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

['X)

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Rupert, ID 83350

~--Steven R. McRae
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MlNIDOKA

WALLY K.A. Y SCHULTZ,

Case No. CV-2011-96

ORDER REGARDING THE

Petitioner~

COURT'S NOTICE OF INTENT
TO DISMISS AND THE
PETITIO:NER'S MOTION TO
AMEND SUCCESSIVE PETITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,-

FOR POST-CONVICflON

RELIEF

. Respondent.

PROCEDURALBACKG~OUND
On September 5, 2013, the court gave notice to the parties of its intent to dismiss
the Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz's (hereafter "Mr. Schultz") Verified Amended

Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. In response, Mr. Schultz filed a Motion to
Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and Reply to Notice of Intent to
Dismiss. The matter came before the court for a hearing on October 28, 2013, at which
time the court took the matter under advisement.
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DISCUSSION
1.

Mr. Schultz's in.effecti'\'e assistallce of counsel claims will not be dismissed at
this time.

In the Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post..ConvictionApplication, the court stated its
intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's claims of ineffective assistance of oouruiel because he only
asserted claims against Clayne Zollinger (hereafter "Mr. Zollinger•j. his attorney in his
two prior post..conviction cases. Since those claims did not constitute legally cognizable
claims for post-conviction relief, dismissal would have been appropriate. However, lvir.
Schultz's proposed Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Petition") contains claims against his attorney in the
underlying criminal cases, David Pena (hereafter "Mr. Penaj. lt also contains allegations

of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding Mr. Zollinger's performance in the prior
post-conviction cases for the pmpose of allowing the claims against Mr. Pena to be
presented in a successive petition. See I.C. § 19-4908; Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438,
441~ 128 P.3d 975) 978 (Ct.App.2006).

Sjnce Mr. Schultz bas remedied the defect the court identified in its Notice of
Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Application, Mr. Schultz's ineffective assistance of

counsel claims against Mr. Pena will not be dismissed at this time pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 19-4906(b).
2.

Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct at
the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are. dismissed.

In the Notice oflntent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Applicatiollt the court stated its
intent to dismiss Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and
misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory for a variety of reasons. Mr.
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Schultz's made no amendments to these claims in his proposed Second Amended
Petition.
For the reasons stated in the court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction
Applicatio~ Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct
at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are dismissed.

3.

Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief is granted in part and denied in part.
A trial court has discretion in determining whether to allow the amendment of

pleadings. See Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trost, LLC, 150 Idaho 393,247 P.3d 620

(20 I 0). The court perceives the issue as a matter of discretion. The court exercises that
discretion within the bollllds provided by the following legal authority.
After a responsive pleading has been filed and the case has been set for 1rial, "a
party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given whenjustice so requires." I.R.C.P. IS(a). The Idaho
Supreme Court has held:

In the absence of any apparent or declared reason--such as undue
delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of
allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the

leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given.

Maroun v. Wyreless Systems, Inc., 141 Idaho 604, 612, 114 P.3d 974, 982 (2005)
(quoting Carl R Christensen Family Trust 11. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871, 993 P .2d
1197, 1202 (1999)).
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Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend is granted .in part. Mr. Schultz is permitted. to
amend the petition in this case regarding his claims of in.effective assistance of counsel

against Mr. Pena (Count One in the proposed Second Amended Petition).
Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend is denied in part. As set forth above, the court
dismissed Mr. Schultz's claims regarding newly discovered evidence and misconduct at
the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory. Therefore, no purpose is served by allowing
these claims (Count Two in the proposed Second Amended Petition) to remain in the

amended pleading.

ORDER
The court enters the following order in this case:
(1)

Mr. Schultz's ineffective assistance of counsel claims will not be

dismissed at this time.
(2)

Mr.

Schultz's

claims

regarding newly

discovered

evidence

and

misconduct at the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory are dismissed.
(3)

Mr. Schultz's Motion to Amend Successive Petition for Post-Conviction

Relief is granted in part and denied in part. Amendment is permitted as to Count One of
the proposed Second Amended Petition. Leave to amend is denied as to Count Two. Mr.

Schultz is permitted to file an amended petition consistent with this Order by the
close of business on November 8, 2013.

/4

It is so ORDERED this ). "/ day of October,

LJ~

MlCHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

l

Nov,eiw.Lv1 ~ 2013, I served a true,

of

· correct copy of the ORDER REGARDING THE COURT'S NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS
AND THE PETITIONER'S MOTION TO AMEND SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF upon the following in the manner provided:
Lance Stevenson
Minidoka County Prosecutor
P. 0. Box368
Rupert, ID 83350
lstevenson@co.minidoka.id.us
Steven R. McRae
P. 0. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
smcrae@magicvalleylegal.com

( ) First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery- Basket

WEmail
( ) First Class Mail
( ) Hand Delivery - Basket

('ftmail

/

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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121 3rd Ave. East
Jerome, ID 83338
Telephone No. (208) 324-7200
Facsimile No. (208) 324-7206
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValley Legal.com
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF

IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,
vs.

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

______________

)
)
)

Respondent.

Case No. CR-2011-96

SECOND VERIFIED AMENDED
SUCCESSIVE PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Wally Kay Schultz, by and through his attorne
y of record,
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and submits this Second
Amended Petition for
Post Conviction Relief.
Petitioner alleges:
1.

The Petitioner is currently detained in the Idaho Correctional Center.

2.

The underlying offenses in this matter are from Minidoka cases CR-20
05-884 (the

"Drug Case") and CR-2005-1139 (the "Battery Case"). Convictions
in these matters occurred in
the Fifth Judicial District of Minidoka County, Rupert, Idaho. Petition
er seeks to consolidate
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both of these cases into one post-conviction case for the purposes of expediency
and judicial
economy and because the claim of Count One as contained herein is the same
for both cases.
3.

In the Drug Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of

Possession of a Controlled Substance, I.C. § 37-2732(C)(l). Sentence was imposed
on
December 15, 2005, and the Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate period of
incarceration of
3 years and an indetem1inate period of incarceration of 4 years.
4.

In the Battery Case, Petitioner was convicted pursuant to a plea of guilty of

Battery, l.C. § 18-903. Sentence was imposed on December l5, 2005, and the
Petitioner was
sentenced to a determinate period of incarceration of 5 years and an indeterminate
period of
incarceration of 5 years.

5.

Petitioner sought post conviction relief in each of the Drug Case and the Battery

Case in Minidoka County Case Nos. CV-2009-221 and CV-2009-47, respectively
(the "Original
Post Conviction Cases"). In both of the Original Post Conviction Cases, Petition
er was
represented by counsel, Clayne S. Zollinger, Jr. ("Zollinger"). In the Original
Post Conviction
Cases, the Court filed an Order on January 8, 2010 granting the State's Motion
to Dismiss both
cases. The primary issue in both of the Original Post Conviction Cases was that
Petitioner"s
underlying counsel in both the Battery Case and the Drug Case was ineffective
as counsel when
he missed a deadline for filing an appeal in both of the cases.
COUN T ONE
Reassertion of Claims Pursuant to Palmer v. Dermitt

6.

Petitioner reasserts via Palmer v. Dermifl , I 02 Idaho 591 (Idaho 1981 ), his claim

for post-conviction relief because of the ineffective assistance of his underlying
criminal counsel,
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David Pena, as asserted in his Original Post-Conviction Cases, and specifically that David
Pena
filed Petitione r's appeal late after being advised by Petitioner that he wished to file an appeal.
7.

Pursuant to Palmer, Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief in this Count One of

this matter based on ineffective assistance of counsel, Zollinger, in his Original Post Convicti
on
Cases. Specifically, Petitioner alleges:
a.

In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, Zollinger failed to contact

Petitione r's underlying criminal attorney, David Pena, to secure information that Petitione
r
requested Mr. Pena to file an appeal on December 12, 2005. Attached hereto as Exhibit A-A
is
a true and correct letter from the Idaho State Bar, which shows information Zollinger failed
to
obtain.
b.

In Petitioner's Original Post Conviction Cases, Zollinger failed to contact

Petitione r's appeHate counsel to secure an affidavit or information from Erik R. Lehtinen
as to
the events of Petitioner's direct appeal in the underlying cases. Attached hereto as Exhibit
B-B
is a true and correct copy of an Affidavit of Erik R. Lehtinen, which shows the information
that
Zollinger failed to obtain.
c.

Zollinger failed to argue information as contained in Petitioner·s

Supplemental Brief in Support of Post Conviction Relief, a true and correct copy of which
is
attached hereto as Exhibit C-C.
d.

Zollinger failed to argue distinguishing facts of Petitioner's case from

Loman v. State, 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002): namely, that in Loman, the defendant was
placed on notice within his post-conviction timeline by the Idaho Supreme Court that the
defendan t's appeal was untimely filed, when in Petitioner's case, Petitioner had no such
notice
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that his appeal was untimely filed, but instead learned that his appeal was untimel
y filed only
after the time for filing his post-conviction had run.
e.

Had Zollinger rendered effective assistance as Petitioner's counsel, by

completing the acts as stated above, Zollinger would have been able to effectiv
ely argue that
Petitioner was wronged by his counsel, David Pena, in his underlying criminal
cases and would
have effectively argued against the State's Motion to Dismiss in the Original Post
Conviction
Cases.

COUNT TWO
NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE
8.

Petitioner seeks post-conviction relief for the Drug Case in this Count Two of this

matter based Idaho Code§ 19-4901(4). Specifically, Petitioner alleges that there
exists evidence
of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of
the conviction of
sentence in the interest of justice, as follows:
a.

That the State in the Drug Case withheld and suppressed (whether

inadvertently or not) information that was favorable to Petitioner's defense, thereby
creating a
Brady/Giglio scenario. The information that was specifically withheld and suppres
sed was that
several employees, including several forensic experts who testify in court proceed
ings on a
regular basis, over a period of several years from 2003 or earlier, to 20 I I, conspire
d to maintain
an ongoing unauthorized quantity of controlled substances and other chemicals

outside the

practices of the forensics quality manual, without proper documentation, tracking
or auditing.
Furthermore, said employees hid said narcotics and chemicals from auditors with
the intent to
deceive.
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b.

A true and correct copy of a letter from a group of prosecutors in the
State

ofldaho to members of the Idaho Bar was filed on February I, 2012,
which contains an
Administrative Investigation Report by the Idaho State Police, was
filed by Petitioner on
Febntary I, 2012 as Exhibit XYZ.
c.

[tis Petitioner's position that because of the actions of the above-

described employees and the lab report provided by said laboratory
in this case, Petitioner was
prohibited from providing a defense in his case that might otherwise
be available to him.
Specifically, Petitioner was prohibited from engaging in appropriate
cross-examination of Skylar
Anderson concerning the above-described violations of laboratory
policies and procedures in
order to impeach him with regards to his credibility and propensity

for truthfulness, all in

violation of the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Constitutional Rights
to confront all witnesses
against him.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief to which Petitioner may
be entitled in this
proceeding, including, but not limited to the following:
I.

That Petitioner be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea in the Drug Case
and have
a trial in the Drug Case, whereby he would have the opportunity to
cross-examine
Skylar Anderson.

2.

That the Petitioner be allowed to re-file his Original Post-Convict
ion Cases and

argue against the State's Motion to Dismiss.
The Petitioner further states that the entirety of his claim for succes
sive post conviction
relief in this case are contained herein. Specifically, Petitioner withdr
aws any claim for newly
discovered evidence as it relates to the Drug Case and Laurie Elizab
eth Freitag, a.k.a. Laurie
Morrill.
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DATED this ~ f September, ;013,
°-'

-

>

McRAE.LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By:.~·

Steven R. McRae
Attorneys for Petitioner
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STATE OF IDAHO
County of""':ti>~\\./CcJQp

)

)ss.
)

Wally Schultz, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as fol1ows:
That he has read the foregoing Verified Amended Successive Petition for Post Conviction

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this ~ a y of September, 20l3.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
•

1

Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the
'1~ctay of Ne/~bl(, 2013, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
document upon the following:

Lance Stevenson
Prosecuting Attorney for
the County of Minidoka

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

P.O. Box 368

{X]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Rupert, ID 83350

Steven R. McRae
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MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
STATE OF IDAHO
LANCE D. STEVENSON, Prosecuting Attorney //SB #7733/
ALAN GOODMAN, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney //SB #2778/
ROBERTS. HEMSLEY, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney //SB #7955/
715 G. Street, P. 0. Box 368
Rupert, ID 83350
Office: (208)436-7187
Facsimile: (208) 436-3177
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF IDAHO

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFfH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
MAGISTRATE COURT

WALLY K. SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,
. vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

) Case No. CV-2011-96
)
)

) ANSWER TO SECOND VERIFIED
) AMENDED SUCCESSIVE PETfflON
) FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
)
)
)

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, by and through Robert S. Hemsley,
Minidoka County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and does hereby answer the
Petitioner's ("Schultz") Second Verified Amended Petition for post-conviction relief
in the above-entitled action as follows:

ANSWER-I
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I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TOWALLY K. SCHULTZ'S POST-CONVICTION
ALLEGATIONS
All allegations made by Schultz are denied by the state unless specifically
admitted herein.
II.
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO SCHULTZ'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS

Answering paragraph one (1) ofSchultz's Second Verified Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent denies the allegations contained therein.
Answering paragraphs two (2) through four (4) of Schultz's Second Verified
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the allegations
contained therein.
Answering paragraph 5 (five) of Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief, Respondent admits the f"mt three sentences from that
paragraph, but at this point, Respondent lacks sufficient information upon which to
base an answer to the fourth and f"mal sentence of paragraph S, and so denies the
claim. Respondent resen-es the right to amend this answer upon further
investigation.
Answering COUNT ONE, paragraphs six (6), seven (7) (a), (b), (c), (d) and
(e) of Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition for Post-conviction Relief,
Respondent denies the allegation contained therein.
Answering COUNT TWO, paragraphs eight (8) (a), (b) and (c), of Schultz's
Second Verified Amended Petition for Post Com.iction Relief, Respondent denies
ANSWER-2
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which involve newly discovered evidence, were dismissed by the Court's Order filed

on October 31, 2013, and the fact that such allegations were resubmitted in this
Second Verified Amended Petition is inconsistent with that Order.

FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition fails to state any grounds upon
which relief can be granted as his claims are both uncognizable and legally
insufficient. Idaho Code§ 19-490l(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).

SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition contains bare and conclusory
allegations and therefore fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code
§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition is untimely under the
appropriate statute of limitations. Idaho Code § 19-4902.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Schultz's Second Verified Amended Petition is an improper successive
petition. Idaho Code § 19-4908.
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WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
a)

That Schultz's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

That Schultz's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed;

c)

For such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the

case.

DATED this

:J£._ day of November 2013.

Ro~~-----~~
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
. 'i ,_
I HEREBY CERT IFY that on this c- l'1

rJJ' day of November, 2013,

I caused

a true and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER to be placed in the United States

mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Steven McCrae
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
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JAN O2 2GH
Steven R. McRae [ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE; PLLC
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
e-mail: SMcRae@MagicValleyLegal .com
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Attorney for Petitio11er

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, TN ANO FOR THE COUNT Y OF MINIDOKA

WALLY K. SCHULTZ,

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

vs.

)

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Case No. CV-2011-96
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

\

_______________
Respondent.

)

)
)

COMBS NOW, Petitioner Wally K. Schultz, by and through his attorney of record,

Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Response 10 Respondent's Motion

For Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-C-0nviction Relief on January 21. 2011. After being
dismisse d on September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 31, 20 l3, the Idaho
Court
of Appeals reversed the September 13, 201?, dismissal and a .temittitur was issued on August
23,
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The case was re-opened and the Court issued a Notice to Dismiss Post-Conviction

application on September 5, 2013. On October 31, 2013, the Court issued an Order dismissing
all claims except those regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. A second Verified Amended
Successive Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief was filed October 31, 2013. The State filed an
answer on November 26, 2013.

II. ARGUMENT
Respondent is incorr~ct in asserting that the Petitioner's claim is procedurally barred
because th1;.· Respondenf s request for summary dismissal is based on a faulty reading of Idaho
Code§ 19-4908. Petitioner's Count I is for post-conviction relief based on the failure of postconviction counsel Clayne S. Zollinger (Zollinger) to investigate ineffective assistance of
Petitioner's ·underlying criminal counsel, David Pena. Zollinger's failure included the failure to
obtain information from the Idaho State Bar favorable to the Petitionei, failure to secure an
affidavit, failure to argue for post-conviction reliet: failure to distinguish negative case law, and
failure to infonn Petitioner of option to appeal. Before addressing Respondent's grounds for
dismissal. a quick review of post.· conviction summary dismissal standards is appropriatt.:.

(1). Post-Conviction Sum.nuu'Y Dismissal StllDdards
The Idaho Supreme Court recently outlined post-conviction law. Ridgley v. State, 148
Idaho 671. 674 227 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2010). Post~conviction proceedings are governed by the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for post-conviction

relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ridgley at 674.
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief,

either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own initiative.

Id. at 675.

"Stunmary dismissal of a post-conviction application is the procedural equivalent of summary
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judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.'1 State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 (2008).
When reviewing the grant of a 1notion for swnmary judgment, this Court applies the same

standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Ridgley at 675. Therefore, when a
court examines an issue for dismissal, the court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact

e:l'.ists based on the p!e-adings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Id.
For purposes of considering a swnmary dismissal motion, an applicant's unoontroverted
factual allegations contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits

are deemed to be true. Hayes v. StateJ 195 P.3d 712, 146 Idaho 353 (Idaho App. 2008} (intemal
citations omitted). The court will detennine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the

pleadings. depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally
construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Kelly v. State, 149

Idaho 517. 521. 236 P.3d 1277 (2010).
(2). Petitioner's elaim is not procedurally bared.

Idaho Code § 19-4908 stat.cs that "[a]II grounds for relief available to an applicant under
thfa at must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended applk:ation. •• Id. If a claim is not
raised it c:annot be tbe basis for a subsequent application "unicss the court finds a ground for

relief which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental 01· amended application.••
Respondent's first

ground for

summary judgment is a blanket statement that Petitioner

did not assert his Count One claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the original,
supplementalt or amended application ... " Respondent's Mot. For Surnm. Dism. and Brief in
Supp. (hereinafter Respondent's Mot) pg. S. Respondent's claim is odd in light of their Motion.

On page two (2)> Respondent writes that Petitioner filed a post-conviction claim in 2009 stating
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that Petitioner "alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel.'' This sentence is
Respondent agreeing that Petitioner alleged an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his
original post-conviction complain in 2009.

Because the original post-conviction complaint

included a claim for ineffective assistance of cowisel, then Idaho Code § 19-4908 would not
prohibit a subsequent post-conviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, the 2011 claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is being asserted against
Petitioners postycon;.-iction counsel Clayne S. Zollinger (Zollinger} which could not have been
brought in the 2009 post-conviction complaint because Zollingcr's ineffective assistance of
counsel had not yet occurred. Finally~ in Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), the Court
clearly established that when a post-conviction attorney fails to bring all post-conviction claims
or fails to adequately assert the post,conviction petitioner's claims, a subsequent post-conviction

attorney can assert the claims that the original wunsel failed to bring or bring the inadequately

asserted claims to appropriate conclusion. Here, Idaho Code § 19-4908 simply does not apply.
(3). Petitioner is within the reasonable time to assert his post-conviction claims
because the daim was not known until 2011.
The Respondent's second argument - that Petitioner failed to fik his subsequent pot!.tconviction petition inside of time limitations - seems to be misplaced.

First, Respondent

argwnents are entirely unclear. It appears that Respondent is arguing that the present postconviction case (CV-2011-96) was untimely brought. As such, Petitioner wiJI only respond to
this argum1:nt.
Idaho Code § 19-4902 creates a one-year (plus forty-two (42) days for appeal) statutory
guideline for the assertion of any known post-conviction claims. However, when an wtlcnown
claim is brought to the attention of a petitioner, the petitioner has a ''reasonable time" in which to
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bring the new post-conviction claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905 (2007).
The first
part of this inquiry is when a petitioner discovers the previously unknown claim. Id.
at 905.
Second, the reasonable time" is not based on a specific date or number scheme.
Id. The
0

Supreme Court held that a "reasona ble time" is to be detennined case-by-case based
on the
unique facts of a case. Id.
Here, Respondent fails to satisfy the first step in stating that Petitioner did not file his
subsequent post•conviction petition within a "rcssona ble tin1s". Step one of the "reasona
ble
time" inquiry demands that Respondent factually establish when Petitioner was aware
of the

inefiective assistance of Zollinger. However, Respondent simply repeatedly refers to filings
completed in 2008. Respond ent's Mot. pg. 7. Yet; what Respondent does not articulate
is how
the legal documents filed in 2008 would have made Petitioner aware of the ineffective
assistance

of counsel that would. occur in 2009 by Zolling~r - i.e., that Zollinger was not adequataly
proceeding on Petitione r's claim against David Pena.
To be clear, Petitioner's claim in Count One of the Second Verified Amended Successiv
e

Petiiion for Post Conviction Relief is based upon Palmer v, D:!rmitt, as explained above.
This
claim states that Clayne Zoliinger faiied to adequately investigate a..YJ.d bring Pclitione r's
claim in
his original post-conviction proceeding (Minidoka County Case No. CV-2009-221).
Petitioner
brought thls claim on January 21, 2011, which was actually before the remittitur was
filed on
CV-2009-2011 on August 8, 20 l 1. In fact, Petitioner filed the present post-conviction
case only
thirteen (13) days after the Court granted the Order Granting Motion to Dismiss in
CV-2009221, which was when Petitioner learned of Zollinger's failure to adequately bring
his postconvictio n daiin.
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In this case, with the facts construed in light most favorable to Petitioner. Respondent has

failed to satisfy the high standards for summary judgment.
111. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court deny Respondent's Motion

for Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter.

DATED this 2nd day of January. 2013.
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

?]~····,

By:'"-J~--~_..-·---··
Steven R. McRae
Attorney for Petitioner
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of January 2014, I served a true and correct

copy of the within and foregoing document upon the following:
Lance Stevenson, Minidoka Prosecuting Attorney [ ]
P.O. Box 368
[ ]
Rupert, ID 83350
[ ]
Fax: (208) 436·3 l n
[x]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Steven R. McRae
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

WALLY K. SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

) Case No. CV-2011-96
)
)

) REPLY TO PETITIONER'S
) RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION
) FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL
)
)
)

COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Respondent, by and through Robert S. Hemsley,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Minidoka County, and respectfully submits this Reply to
Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary Dismissal.

Reply to Section (2) of the Petitioner's Response
In Section (2) of the petitioner's response, he argues that the State has relied on a
"faulty reading ofldaho Code § 19-4908," which reads as follows: "[a]ll grounds for relief
available to an applicant under this act must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended
Reply to Petitioner's Response To
State's Motion For Summary Dismissal
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application. Any ground ... not so raised ... may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended application."
The clear language of that statute indicates that the issue before the Court here is that
any claims brought in this successive post-conviction petition should have been raised in the
original petition. If they were not, they are barred by LC. §19-4908 unless there was a
"sufficient reason" for which they were not t5serted. Some confusion of this issue is evident in
the petitioner's response where he argues that he in fact did raise his Count I claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel-as currently pied in this case-in the original petition; he
argued that "[b]ecause the original post-conviction complaint included a claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, then Idaho Code § 19-4908 would not prohibit a subsequent postconviction claim for ineffective assistance of counsel."

If the claim currently before the Court were properly asserted in the original postconviction petition, then it is barred by the doctrine of res judicata by the summary dismissal of
the original application and subsequent affirmation of that summary dismissal by the appellate
court. If the petitioner would like to concede this fact as he argues in his response, it would
create another basis for summary dismissal.
However, as is clearly evident from the procedural history relevant to this successive
petition as well as the appellate opinion dismissing the original petitions (See Schultz v. State,
151 Idaho 383, at 387 (Ct.App.2011), the petitioner has not previously and properly pied this
particular claim asserted in Count One of the Second Verified Amended Successive Petition for
Post-conviction. Thus, the claim is procedurally barred unless the Court determines there is
"sufficient reason" for which it was not raised.

Reply to Petitioner's Response To
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Reply to Section (3) of the Petitioner's Response
In his response, the petitioner confuses the separate claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and post-conviction counsel, and each distinct ineffective assistance claim's
relevance to this motion for summary dismissal. In reply to the argument that the petitioner has
brought this successive post-conviction claim within a "reasonable time" as·required by the
analysis of "sufficient reason" to file a successive petition pursuant to I. C. §19-4908, is it
necessary to separate the two distinct ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the relief that
they can provide.
First, his claim of ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel-that of Mr.
Zollinger-can only be a basis for determining whether there is "sufficient reason" for filing a
successive petition, not as a basis for post-conviction relief. (See this Court's discussion in its
Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-conviction Application filed on September 5, 2013, p. 4-6.)
Second, the claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel-that of Mr. Pena-can only be
asserted as a basis for post-conviction relief in a successive petition if the Court finds "sufficient
reason" for allowing the successive petition under I.C. §19-4908.
Whether this successive petition was filed within a "reasonable time" is dependent upon
when the petitioner became aware of the basis for post-conviction relief, and here the only claim
that is potentially proper for post-conviction relief is the ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

Mr. Pena, and his failure to file a timely appeal. Thus the relevant inquiry for a ''reasonable
time" is into when the petitioner became aware of Mr. Pena's ineffective assistance of counsel
(November 24, 2008) and the time he filed this successive post-conviction petition (January 21,
2011), not when the petitioner first became aware of the alleged ineffective assistance of Mr.
Zollinger.
Reply to Petitioner's Response To
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The petitioner attempts to confuse the issue by arguing that the "reasonable time"
inquiry "demands that Respondent factually establish when Petitioner was aware of the
ineffective assistance of Zollinger." However, the State's position is that Mr. Zollinger' s
involvement only becomes relevant if this Court first determines that this successive petition
was filed within a "reasonable time" of when the petitioner became aware of Mr. Pena's alleged
ineffective assistance of counsel. If the Court determines that it was not filed within a
"reasonable time/' then the petition must be summarily dismissed pursuant to I.C. §19-4908. If
however, the Court determines that the successive petition was filed within a ''reasonable time,"
then the inquiry properly becomes whether the alleged ineffective assistance of Mr. Zollinger
during the prior post-conviction proceedings is "sufficient reason" for not asserting the
allegation of Mr. Pena's ineffective assistance in the original petition, and therefore would
allow the filing of this successive petition.
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the proper time period to consider for the
"reasonable time" inquiry were the delay between the point the petitioner became aware of Mr.
Zollinger's alleged ineffective assistance and the time he filed this successive petition, this
successive petition would still be untimely. The petitioner claims in his latest iteration of the
successive petition that had Mr. Zollinger rendered effective assistance of counsel, then he
would have been able to effectively argue against the state's motion to summarily dismiss the
prior post-conviction cases, and prevent the prior cases from being summarily dismissed. If the

prior post-conviction cases were summarily dismissed because of the ineffective assistance of
post-conviction counsel as petitioner alleges, then the petitioner became aware of the alleged
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel on January 8, 2010, when those cases were

summarily dismissed. Thus, on January 21, 2011, this successive petition was filed over one
year after the petitioner became aware of his ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel
Reply to Petitioner's Response To
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claims and over two years after he became aware of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims. The petitioner is completely mistaken on page five of his response when he argues that
he filed this successive petition only thirteen days after the prior post-conviction cases were
dismissed; it was filed one year and thirteen days later as the prior petitions were dismissed on
January 8, 2010, not in 2011.
The petitioner also alludes to the filing of the remittitur in the prior post-conviction case
on August 8, 2011 as relevant to the determination of whether this successive petition was filed
within a "reasonable time." If the petitioner wants to justify his delay in filing this successive
petition because he was waiting for the appeal in the prior cases to become final, it is a
disingenuous attempt for two reasons. First, pursuant to the case law explained in the State's
motion for summary dismissal and also here below, the proper inquiry is when he became aware
of the claim, not when any appellate proceedings became final. Second, the petitioner did not in
fact wait for the appellate opinion or remittitur to be filed; he filed this untimely successive
petition months before either of those documents were even filed by the appellate court.
Given this procedural history, pursuant to Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 191-92, 177
P.3d 400, 405-06 (Ct. App. 2008), this successive petition was not filed within a "reasonable
time." The Schwartz case stated as follows:
On May 3, 2005, the district court denied Schwartz's motion to extend the filing
time based on attorney Parrish's admitted failure to file an initial application
within the limitation period. Schwartz was informed at that time that her letter
and subsequent filings had not extended the limitation period and that the district
court would not grant her an extension of time to file an initial application.
Schwartz, however, waited until April 26, 2006--almost twelve months--to mail
an application alleging that ineffective assistance of her appointed postconviction counsel was the reason that she had not timely filed an initial
application. 5 We can perceive ofno sufficient reason why it took Schwartz
almost twelve months to file this application.
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Id Our case is very similar because the original petitions in this case were summarily
dismissed by this district Court on the basis that they were untimely, and in Schwartz, the
district court denied a request for a time extension to file an initial application: both were
disposed of on the basis of being untimely. Furthermore, the petitioner in this case, like

Schwartz, claims that the original petitions were dismissed because of the ineffective assistance
of post-conviction counsel. The distinction between the cases, however, is in the fact that the
petitioner here actually waited longer to file the successive post-conviction application than did
the petitioner in Schwartz. Whether the Court analyzes the timeliness of this successive filing
based on the discovery of the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, or the discovery of
the alleged ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel, this petition was not filed within a
''reasonable time."
The Court of Appeals statement from its affirmation of the summary dismissals of the
petitioner's prior post-conviction application is equally applicable here: "[t]hat Schultz chose
not to file his post-conviction petitions earlier because he was under the mistaken belief that the
law allowed him more time to file, does not equate, as Schultz contends, to a deprivation of any
reasonable opportunity to do so. Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383,387,256 P.3d 791, 795 (Ct.
App.2011).

Additional Basis For Summary Dismissal
The following additional basis for summary dismissal is raised here for the first time,
therefore, the petitioner should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond if he so chooses.

If the Court determines that this successive petition was timely filed, the petitioner is
still not entitled to relief. The original petitions for post-conviction relief were summarily
dismissed because they were not timely. Even had Mr. Zollinger done everything that the
petitioner alleges he should have, the prior petitions would still have been untimely and subject
Reply to Petitioner's Response To
State's Motion For Summary Dismissal
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to smnmary dismissal. There is nothing post-conviction counsel, who was appointed after
Schultz filed those initial petitions, could have done to have them filed earlier, it is a factual
impossibility.
The petitioner claims in Count One paragraph 7.d. and e. of the petition that had Mr.
Zollinger argued distinguishing facts of the petitioner's case from those in Loman v. State, 138
Idaho 1 (Ct.App.2002), the prior post-conviction cases would not have been summarily
dismissed. The prior post-conviction cases are not distinguishable from Loman. There is
sufficient information in the record for the Court to make the determination in this case, even if
Mr. Zollinger had or had not done everything the petitioner has alleged, that it would not have
changed the outcome of this Court's prior summary dismissal based on the untimely filing of
the original post-conviction petitions. The fact that the petitioner's prior prose post-conviction
filings were untimely was completely beyond the control of Mr. Zollinger. Even had Mr.
Zollinger gained the Court's permission to properly plead the petitioner's claim against Mr.
Pena, the petition was still untimely and would have been dismissed.

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing discussion, as well as the State's Motion For Summary
Dismissal, the State respectfully requests that the petition and all of its claims be summarily
dismissed pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 19-4906(c) and 19-4908.

DATED this

.J_day of-----"'":-,L.<.J,4-,u-'---_u_._A_fl.,_,_y_ _---'2014.

R:tf:1/f=hDeputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH£ FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR I'dE COL'NTY OF MINIDOKA
WALLY K.. SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
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)
)
)
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)

Case No. CV-2011~96
STIPUL.\TION TO VACATE

HEARING

____

COMES NOW the Petitioner, Wally K. Schuitz, by and through his aitom.ey of record.
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and Robert S. Hemsley, attorney for State of
Idaho, and stipulate to vacate the hearing currentiy scheduled for January 17. 2014 at 1:30 p.m.

in order to allow the Petitioner adequate time to answer State's "Additional Basis for Summary
Dismissal.. as stated b:1 the State's Reply to Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary

Dismissal.
DATED this

'fJ'-_ day offanuary, 2014.
MCRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC
~ ~ " '

1 _ _ _ _ __
By: _-__;_D_
t-,_

Steven R. McRae

Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

WALLY K. SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2011-96

PETITIONER,S RESPONSE TO
RESPONDENT,S ADDITIONAL BASIS
F'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Petitioner Wally K. Schultz, by and through his attorney of record,
Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Response to Re~pondent's

Additional Basis For Summary Judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matt.er.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGR.OUND
Petitioner filed a Petition foe Post-Conviction Relief on January 21, 2011. After being
dismissed on September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed an appeal. On July 31, 2013, the Idaho Court
of Appeals reversed the September 13, 2012, dismissal and a remittitur was issued on August 23,
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The case was re-opened and the Court issued a Notice to Dismiss Post-Conviction

2013.

application on September 5, 2013. On October 31, 2013, the Court issued an Order dismissing
all claims except those regarding ineffective assistance of counsel. A second Verified Amended
Successive Petitioner for Post-Conviction Relief was filed October 31, 2013. The State filed an
answer on November 26, 2013. On December 12, 2013, the State filed a Motion Jot Summa,:i,•

Dismissal. Petitioi1er responded to the A.fotionfor Summmy Dismissal on Jmmary 2, 2014. On
January 7, 2014, the: state responded to Petitioner and made an additional claim for summary

dismissal, which brings us to t'1is response.
II. ARGUMENT

The State has failed to show why the original petition for post-conviction relief does not
comport with the "reasonable time" standard as created by the Idaho Supreme Court. Before
addressing the State's new gronnd for sununary dismissal, a review of the post-conviction

summary dismissal standard is appropriate.
(1). Post-Conviction Summary Dismissal Standards

The Idaho Supreme Court recently outlined post-conviction law. Ridgley v. State, 148

Idaho 671, 674 227 P.3d 925 (Idaho 2010). Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 19-4901 et seq. A petition for postconviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Ridgley

at 674.

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-

conviction relief: either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court's own initiative. ld.
at 675. "Summary dismissal of a post-conviction application is the procedural equivalent of
summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56." State v. Yakovac. 145 ldaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476,483
(2008). When reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies .the
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same standard used by the district court in ruling on the motion. Ridgley at 675. Therefore, when
a court exrunines an issue for dismissal, the court must detennine whether a genuine issue of fact
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file. Id.
For purposes of considering a summary dismissal motion, an applicant's uncontroverted
factual allegations contained in an application for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavits
are deemed to be true. Hayes v. Staff:, 195 P.3d 712, 146 Idaho 353 (Idaho App. 2008) (internal
citations omitted). The Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings. depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file and will liberally

construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Kelly v. State, 149
Idaho 517, S21, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010).

(2). Petitioner's claim is not procedurally bared.
The State now asserts that Petitioner's claims should be bared pursuant to Idaho Code §

19-4902. According to Idaho Code § 19-4902, a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed

''at any time within one (I) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal." Loman v. State. 138 Idaho 1 (Ct. App. 2002). However, the Courts
have recognized an exception to the time limits established in Idaho Code § 19-4902. When an
unknown claim is brought to the attention of a petitioner, the petitioner has a ''reasonable time''

in which to bring the newly discovered post-conviction claim. Charboneau v. State, 144 ldaho
900, 905 (2007). There aze two pa11s in determining the legal meaning of "reasonable time."

See Id. The first part of the inquiry is to establish when a petitioner discovers the previously
unknown claim. Id. at 905. The second part of the inquiry establishes whether an individual

flied a petition for post-conviction relief within a reasonable time period upon learning of the
new evidence. In detcm1ining a ''reasonable time" the Court does not look at a specific date or
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number scheme; rather, the "reasonable time" standard can only be determined by analyzing the

unique facts on a case-by-case basis. Id.
Here, as in the fi1·st Motion for Summary Judgment, the State fails to satisfy the first step
of the "rersonable time" inquiry. Step (me of the "reasonable time" inquiry demands that the
State factually establish when Petitioner was aware of the ineffective assistance of counsel.
However, the State presents no facts establishing the date when Petitioner was aware that Mr.
Pena had failed to file a timely appeal. Indeed, the State presents no supporting facts at all.
As Petitioner had requested that Mr. Pena file an appeal, Petitioner was patiently awaiting
the result of the appeal before proceeding with a petition for post-conviction reliet: Petitioner's

appeal was being handled by Erik Lehtinen of the State Appellate Public Defenders Office. As
shown by Exhibit B-B, which is attached to this answer and to the Amended Petition in this case,

Mr. Lehtinw conti11~1ally assured Petitioner that there was n<> need to file a post-conviction
petition until the appeal was detem1ined.

Affidavit of Erik R Lehtinen ~ 23, 28, 29.

Mr.

Lehtinen continued to inform Petitioner from July of 2006 until September of 2008 that he
needed to wait to fik a petition for post-conviction relief until the appeals case was concluded.

Id. However, in September of2008 Mr. Lehtinen fully reviewed Petitioner's appeal and realized
that the appeal was likely untimely. Id. at ~ 43. Mr. Lehtinen, realizing the gravity of the
situation~ informed petitioner of the immediate need to file a petition for post-conviction relief.

Jd. Upon receiving this coW1Sel from Mr. Lehtinen, Petitioner filed his first post-conviction
petition in January of 2009.
Petitioner was informed for the first time of Mr. Pena's untimely appeal in September of
2008. The.refore, Petitioner,s "reasonable time,, clock would begin on September of 2008, when
he became awmse of Mr. Pena's terrible error. Here. the State has presented no evidence showing
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that Petitioner was aware, prior to September 2008, of the ineffoctive counsel due to Mr. Pena1 s
failure to file an appeal. Indeed. the affidavit of Mr. Lehtinen plainly shows that Petitioner was

unaware of the untimely nature of the appeal u11til late 2008. In addition, whereas Petitioner
filed his first post-co1wiction petitioner in January of 2009, the State has faile.d to show why the

passage of three (3) months would not be a reasonable time period. for an incarcerated individual
to file a petition with the Court.

Furthem1ore, as set forth in the Amended Successive Petiti(Jn for Post-Conviction Relief.
the original post-co1wiction tiled would not have been dismissed, had Clayne Zollinger fulfilled

his duty of due diligence. Because Clayne Zollinger did not obtain Mr. Lehtinen's affidavit,
Clayne Zollinger did not know the factual and legal basis why Petitioner was well within bis
right to file a petition for post-convicti011 relief after statutory time passed. Finally, in Palmer v.

Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591 (1981), the Court clearly established that when a post-conviction
attorney fails to bring all post-conviction claims, a subsequent post-conviction attorney can
assert the claims that the original counsel failed to bring. Here, Mr. Zollinger failed to provide
effective assistance of counsel by not researching the mistakes of Mr. Lehtinen. This

was a

failure to bring all post-conviction claims. Now, Petitioner's Counsel is asserting the claims that

original counsel failed to bring.
In this case, with the facts construed in light most favorable to Petitioner, the State has
failed to satisfy the demanding standards for summary judgment.

UL CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that this Court deny the State's addition

grounds for sununary judgment. Oral Argument is requested on this matter.
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DATED this 29th day of .January, 2014.
McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By:.%8~
Steven R. McRae
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the '29 _day of"J)))W4Yl~ 2014, I served a true and
correct copy of the within and foregoing document upon the foil wing:
Lance Stevenso11, Minidoka Prosecuting Attorney

[ ]

P.O. Box 368
Rupert, ID 83350
Fax.: (208) 436-3177

[ ]
[ ]
[x ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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AFFIDAVIT
STATE OF IOAHO

l

ss

COUNTY OF ADA
es and says;
ERIK R. LEHTINEN, being first duly sworn on oath, depos
(1)

of Idaho;
I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State

(2)

llate Public Defender
I am presently employed by the Idaho State Appe
and have been so
{"SAPD") as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defender,

employed for some six and one-half years;
(3)

der, I represented
In my capacity as a Deputy State Appellate Public Defen
Wally

in
Kay Schultz In the consolidated direct appeal of his convictions

Case") and CR~
Minidoka County Case Nos. CR-2005-884 (the "Drug

Supreme Court
2005~ 1135 (the "Battery Case"), which were denominated
Nos. 33255 and 33256, respectively,

(4)

on appeal;

post-conviction
I also currentty represent Mr. Schultz in a consolidated
} arising out of the
appeal (Supreme Court Case Nos. 37370 and 37371

g out
summary dismissal of post-conviction petitions arisin

ot the

aforementioned criminal convictions;
·

(5)

of the records on
All matters set forth herein are based on my review
of the records of the
appeal In the above-referenced cases, my review

SAPD, and my personal knowledge:

(6)

ate and complete
"fhe purpose of this affidavit is to set forth an accur

known that his
timeline of events conceroing Mr. Schultz's ability to have
filed and, therefore,
consolidated direc t appeal may have been untimely

EXHIBIT
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filing his petition(s) for post-conviction
the one·year statute of limitation for
uant to tC. § 19-4902(a);
reltef was not automatically tolled purs

Schultz was found guilty in the
In August of 2005, following a jury trial, Mr.

(7)

Battery Case;
Case,
ultz was sentenced in the Battery
On December 12, 2005, Mr. Sch

(8)

ion;
and the district court retained jurisdict

(9)

5, Mr. Schultz pied guilty, pursuant
Later in ihe day on December 12, 200
Case and, again. the district court
to a plea agreemen( in the Drug
retained jurisdiction;

(10)

of retained jurisdiction, i.e., a ''rider,"
On May 22, 2006 1 following a period
and
Schultz's sentences in both cases
the di$trict court suspended Mr.

porart probation orders the same
pl&ced him on probation. It issued "tem
day;
(11 )

ing
court entered formal orders plac
On Ma y 25, 2006, the district

Mr. Schultz on probation;
(12)

e
a Notice of Appeal bearing the cas
On July 6, 2006, Mr. Schultz filed
the Battery Case:
numbers for both the Drug Case and

(13)

ointed.to represent Mr. Schultz In both
On July 7, 2006 1 the SAPD was app
red
2006, the Idaho Supreme Court orde
appeals and, on September 27,
the two appeals consolidated;

(14)

O received the Clerk's Record and
On January 11, 2007 1 the SAP
dated direct appeal;
Reporter's Transcript for the consoli
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On or about February 21 1 2007, Molly J. H~k:ey engaged in a CUl'l~ry

!"1View the Clerk~s ~ecord ~d Reporter's Transcript. filed a motion to

autpend the briefing schedule on appeal pending disposition of some

then-pending alleged probation violations, filed a motion to augment the
record with a copy of an as-yet-unprepared tra,,script and to suspend the
briefing schedule on appeal pending preparation of the missing transcript,

and assigned Mr. Schultts conaolidsted direct appeal to me;

(16)

On March 2. 20071 the Supreme Court granted the motion to augment the
record and suspended the briefing schedute pending ·preparation of the

requested transcript;
(17)

On March 20, 2007, although the· requested transcript had already been
prepared, the Supreme Court order~ that the briefing schedule continue

to be suspended pending dispo$ition of the aforementioned alleged
probation violations;
(18)

•...

On July 10, 2007, I spoke to Mr. Schultz for the first time, explaining that .

.,~'i•

since the briefing schedule was stlU suspended (at that time, I mistakenly
believed we were waiting for a transcript, not disposition of the alleged

probation violation). I had not reviewed his case;
(19)

On August 1, 2007, I again spoke to Mr. Schultz, whereupon I again

indicated that I had not rew,wed the oase because the briefing schedule
was stm suspended (I stiff mistakenly believed we were waiting for ~

transcript, not disposition of the alleged probation violation):

-
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During the fan of 2007, concerned about the length of time that
Mr. Schultz's appeal had been suspended, 1 investigated the

reason for

the suspension. looked into the status of the alleged probation violations,

leamed that the probation violations had already been adjudicated. and
requested all of lhe relevant materials from the district court. At that time,

t still had not reviewed the record in the consolidated appeal;
(21)

I spoke to Mr. Schultz again on Noverri.ber 5. 2007, November 27, 2007.
and January 14. 2008. During most of those conversations, we discussed
the status of the suspension of the. consolidated appeal.

During the

January 14, 2008 conversation, however, we discussed post-conviction

relief petitions:

{22}

On · February 28, 2008: t received corffl$pondence from Mr. Schultz
conttlining statements from certain Wf(nes&e$;

(23}

I responded to Mr. Schultz:'s February letter on March 3, 2008. In my
letter, I explained that new evidence could not be utilized on appeal.
reminded Mr. Sohuttz that claims of inaffecti"e es,istance of counsel are
best reised in post-conviction proceedings, and concluded with the

folfowing statement; "Because those claims are best reserved for postconviction, I suggest that you hold on to the notarized statements and
consider using them to ·support a post-conviction petition whert the direct

appeal is ovel' (emphasis added};
(24)

In the meantime, on February 11, 2008, the Supreme Court had ordered
the briefing schedule resumed;

73 of 109
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(25)

On May 16, 2008, I spoke to Mr. Schultz.

agaio. During that discussion*

aling from a judgment
we talked about the fact that the time limit for appe

granted a ''rider."
of conviction is extended where the defendant is

consolidated
Notably, at that time, I still had not reviewed the record in his
al in his case
al and, thus, I stilt had no idea that the notice of appe
appe

ction.
might not have been timely from his judgment of convi
{28)

that I finally had an
It was not Ulltil approximately May 22, 2000

d in Mr. Schultz's
opportunity to review (in any detail at all) the recor

consolidated direct appeal;
(27)

2006 revealed
My thorough review of the record on (or about) May 22,
, on May 23, 2008, I
that three additional transcripts were needed. Thus
ssary transcripts)
filed another motion to augment the record (Wilh the nece

preparation of the
and to suspend the briefing schedule (pending
20, 2008;
requested transcripts). That motion was granted on June
(2C)

At that time, I did not
On June 5, 2008, I spoke to Mr Schultz again.
been untimely filed, and I
infon n him that his notice of appeal may have

post-oonv:ction relief
did not ~dvise him to file his patition(s) for

t th~ advisability of
immediately. In fact, when Mr. Schultz inquired abou
g to the Drug Case,
filing a po&t-cooviction petition based on issues relatin
n at that time, but went
I told him that he could file a po5t-conviction petitio
his direct appeal before
on to advise him to wait until the conclusion of
fi/ir,g his post•conviction petition;
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In my
In the meantima, Mr. Schultz had written to me on May 30, 2008.
mention
June 18, 2008 response to that letter, l again failed to make any

that
of the possibility that his notice of appeal had been untimely filed, or
the statute of limitation for his post-conviction petition(&) may have begun
"First, you
to run. In fact, I suggested otherwise when I wrote as follows:

are correct about the orie-year time limit for filing a petition for postoonviotion relief.

That fime lim/1 will not begin to nm until the present

asis
appeal has concluded and a 'n,mittitur' hss been issued' (emph
added);

(30)

n of
I spoke to Mr. Schultz again on August 7, 2008. I still did not mentio
the
the possibility that his notice of appeal had been untimely filed, or that
statute of limitation for post-conviction may have begun to run;

(31)

of the
In August or September of 2008, I received and reviewed the last
the
transcripts from Mr. Schultz's criminal cases, reacquainted myself with
record in his appeal, and finalized his Appellant's Brief;

(32)

duct in
I filed the Appellant's Brief (asserting claims of prosecutorial miscon
the Batter / case) on September 4 1 2008;

{33)

the
Afso on September 4, 2008, I spoke to Mr. Schultz again. During
was any
course of that conversation, Mr. Schultz again asked me if there
him
reason not to file his petmon(s) for post-conviction relief. I again told

should
that conventional wisdom dictates that a would-be petitioner

wait

for post~
until his direct appeal has concluded before filing his petition(s)
he could
conviction relief, but I further explained that l saw no reason why

.....
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not file his petition(s) immediately. I atilt did not mention of the possibility
that Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal had been untimely fled, or that

the

statute of llmltatlon for his post-conviction pelltlon(s) may have begun to

run already;
(3<4)

My notes do n01 reflect whether it was (luring my May 2008 review of

Mr. Schultz's case, or my August/September 2008 re-review of hlS case,
that t first discovered

that there was a potent;al problem with the

.tlmeliness of Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal; however, I do recalt that It was
during preparation of Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Brief that I first spotted this
issue. Accordingly, I have no doubt that l first identified this issue In either
late May 2008. or late August/early ~ptember 2008i
(36)

I edao remember that I did not see thia IGaue at a particularly significant
problem at the

time.

Although-I remember discovering that Mr. Schultz's

notice of. appeal was filed 42 days abr the "final• order placing him ori
probation, and 45 days after the "temporary" order placing him on
probation. I felt oonfident at that time that the ··temporary" probation order
W$S not a final appealable order within the meaning of

t.A.R. 11(0) and,

thus, the 42-day time limit for filing a notice of appeal did not begin to run

until iesuance of the "finat• probatiot:1 order, which was a final appealable
order. t· reached this conclueion without refrnhing my memory as to the

language of Ruin 11(c) or 14(a);
(36) ·Bec.auee I did not

soe a eigniflcant problem with the timeHneas of

Mr. Schultz's notice of appeal, Jnd never even Imagined that his appeal

:
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would be dismissed, or that his.time Umitfor filing his petttlon(s)·for postconViCUon relief could be deemed to have begun to run already, it never
.

.

occurred to me to bring the matter to ·Mr. Schultz's attention, or to advise
him to ·file his petltion(s) for post-conviction relief immediately;
(37}

On November 24, 2008. the State filed its Respondent's Brief asserting
that Mr. Schultz'& appeal was untimely, at least as to claims arising out of

his conviction and sentence, because the notice of appeal was filed more
than 42 days after Mr. Schultz was placed on probation;
(38)

On December 12. 2008. I spoke to Mr. Schulz regarding the state's

Respondent's Brief. At that time, Mr. Schultz

wa&

concemed with the

b"tate's argument that his appeal was.not timely; however, since I had not
yet had an opportunity to review the Respondent's Brief, all c could tell

Mr. Schuttz at that time was that I would look Into the timeliness issue

when I had a chance to revisit his case;

(39)

On January 7, 2009, I spoke lo Mr. Schultz again.

At that time,

Mr. Schultz was still concenwd with the State's argument that hia appeal

was not timely: however, owing to my excessive caseload, I ~ had not

had an opportunity to revisit Mr. Schultt's case and review the
Respondenf1 Brief and, thus, had to put Mr. Schultz off again;

(40)

I finaUy had an opportunity to revisit Mr. Schultz's case and review the
Respondent's Brief in .arty February of 2009:

(41)

Upon revieWing the Slate'$ Respondent's Brief, ,e..reading I.A.R. 1-4(a),

and giving some additional thought to the matter, I quickly concluded that
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my initial impressions concerning the timeliness of Mr. Schuttz's notice of
appeal were completely off-base. I realized that. in the unique situatiOn of

a ·r1der.• the time to appeal from the judgment of conviction begins to run
•tw]hen the court releases its retained jurisdiction or places the defendant
on proba~n· and, thus, the question of whether there i& a final,

appealable order within the meaning of Rule 11(c) Is irretevant;
(42)

While I

was

able to make a colorable argument (in Mr. Schultz's

AppeUant's Reply Brief, flied February 11, 2009, and at oral argument
before the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2009) that the oral pronouncement
and '1emporary'" order in Mr. Schultz's case was insufficient to "place[ 1the
defendant on probation• within the meaning of Rule 14(a), f recognized
that this WM a far weaker argument than I oriL1inally thought I would be

able to make if the State raise~ the Issue of the timeHness of Mr. Schultz's
appeal;

(43)

In light of my new, more-informed analysis of the kisue of the timeliness of
Mr. SchultZ's notice of appeal, I promptly infonned Mr. Schultz of the

possibiity that his appeal might be dismissed; however, I initially failed to
advise him to file his post-conviction petition(s) immediately (inetead, t

continued to advise him, consistent with conventional wisdom, to wait until
hi& direct appeal had concluded). On February 11, 2009, the same date

that I filed Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Reply Brief. I wrote to him as follows;

My reco!lemion is that when I originally reviewed your case, I
noticed that the notice of appeal \'V8S not timely from the
district court's temporary order placing you on probation, but
~a& filed 42 days attar the district court's fcrmal order was.

./
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time and
filed. I foresaw a potential problem with this at that
issue in
this
g
undin
surro
was camful in discussing the faot5
ading,
misle
or
nest
disho
be
the Appellant's Brief. I couldn't
tion to
atten
ary
cess
unne
any
but I also did not want to draw

d not
these facts because my hope was that the State wouleven if
that
ved
belie
I
spot this potential isSue. At that time,
g
the State did spat this, we would have a fairly stron

ing until
argument that your time to appeal did not start runti
raised
has
State
the
that
Now
the fom1al c,rder was entered.
Idaho
w
revie
to
ty
rtuni
oppo
an
the issue and I have had
not
Appellate Rule 14(a) more carefully, however, I do
ght it
thou
ally
origin
·
1
as
g
stron
as
is
t
believe our argumen
if the State
was. Thus, at this time, I would not be surprised
isses your
prevail3 on this issue and the appellate-court dism
appeal. ObviQusly, this is not good news at alt

If it turns out that the your appeal is dismissed, I
on for postwould strongly urge you to consider filing a petiti
ded
provi
Pena
Mr.
that
conviction relief contending
the notice
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file

of appeal sooner.

(44)

led conversation with
On March 5, 2Q09, I had a fairly long and detai
appeal, the fact that I now
Mr. Schultz about the timeliness of his notice of
issed, and the possibility of
believed that his appeal was likely to be dism
that his trial counsel had
filing a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
es of appeal. At that time, I
been ineffective for railing to file timely notic

d about when the one-year
explained for the first time that I was concerne
be deemed to have begun
statute of limitations may begin running (or may
or when, the postM
running). I explained that I did not know whether,
run and, therefore, in an
conviction statute of limitations had begun to
to file his post-conviction
abundance of caution, I advised Mr. Schultz:
petitlon(s) as soon as possible;
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(45)

On May 29, 2009, the Idaho Court of Appeals di&miSSed Mr. Schultz's
consolidated direct appeal for lack of jurisdiction, based upon its

conclusion that the notice of appeal had not been ttmely fded;

(48)

I filed a petition for review with the Idaho Supreme Court, as well as a
supporting brief, but on August 20. 2009, the Supreme Court denied

review. It issued a remittitur on August 27, 2009;
(47)

In 1he meantime, on January 13, 20091 Mr. Schultz had filed a post-·

conviction petition based on his conviction In the Drug Case and, on

February 20, 2009, filed an amended petition alleging, in

part

that his

counsel had rendered ineffective aesistance for ·tailing to flte a timely
notice of appeal In the Drug Case;
(48)

Later. on March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a petition for post-oonviction
relief based on his conviction in the Battery case. On November 12,

2009. he made a supplemental tiling in that case, alleging that his counsel
had rendered ~ v e assistance for failing to fde a timely notice of
appeal in the Battery Case;
(49)

Although counsel was ~ppointed to represent Mr. Schultz in his post-

conviction cues. and although his counsel advanced an equitable
toffing/diaoovery exception argument in response· to the State's oontentlon
that Mr. Schultz's post-conviction petitions were untimely filed, coumset

never contacted me to secure an affidavit such as this one, or even to
Investigate the fact that Mr. Schultz could not have known that the statute
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of limitation for his post~convlction claims may have been running even

While his dire~t appeal was still pending;

(50)

Nevertheless, Mr. Schultz called me himself on August 14, 2009 and
asked me to prepare an affidavit outlining the above facts. At that time, I

told him I would be happy to provide such an affidavit but,
misunderstanding the proceduraf posture of his post-conviction cases (as
it turns out, the State had already filed a motion fer summary dismissal of
the petition relating to the Battery Case based, primarily, on the statute of
limitation), I declined to do so immediately:
(51)

On September 2, 2009, I received a letter from Mr. Schultz again inquiring
about my willingness to prepare an affidavit on his behalf;

(52)

On September 3, 2009, I responded to Mr. Sc."lultz's letter.

As my

response indicates, at that time, I was still unwilling to provide the
requested affidavit because, still misunderstanding the procedural posture

of his post-coiwiction cases (by this point, the State had filed a motion for
summary dismissal of the petition relating to the Drug Case as wellagain, based primarily on the statute of limitation), I felt that the affidavit
might actually harm his post..conviction cases. My response included the
following:
I was concerned that the disclosure of such an affidavit, if
not appropriately timed, might actually be detrimental.

With regard to this latter point, as I explained on the

telephone, you may never need an affidavit from me
because the State may never argue that your post-conviction
petition was not timely filed. In such a case, I would be very
reluctant to provide the affidavit to you for fear of you
disclosing it prematurely and, thereby, tipping the State off to

81 of 109

01-29-'14 10:46 FROM-Hepworth &Assoc.

82 of 109

T-0:::6 P0020/0021 F-019

a statute qf limitations argument that it had not previously
thought of. On the other hand1 if ihe State moves for
summary dilminal of your petition for post-conviotio.n relief
(or If the district court gives notice of ita intent to dl$miss your
petition) on the basis that the one-year sta~te of limitation
began to run even before the court of Appeals dismissed
your appeal, then I will be happy to provide you with an
affidavit ...•
(63)

Ultim.tely, in the absence o~ my affidavit the diatrict court rejected
Mr. Schultz.'& equitable totling/discoverv e>ecsptton arguments and

summarily dismissed his post·con\iction pe~tions as having been filed
outside the one-year &tato1a of limitation;

(54)

Had Mr. Schultz's post-conviction counsel contacted me, l could have

provided evidence, I.e., an affidavit such at this one, that I believe would
have · provided

additional·. support

for

Mr.

Schultz's

equitable

toling/discovery exception argument in 1'88ponse to the State's statute of

!Imitations defense in his post.conviction caseaj

(55) Given Mr. Schultz's trial COUO$el's action in filing a late notice of appeal.
my early assurances that Mr. Schultz could wait to file his petition(s) for·
post-com,iotion

n1Hef, ai,d my '1/ery

late recognition that the

notice

of

appeal was probably untimely, I simply do not see any way that

Mr. Schultz could have known that hit oonsolidated direct appeal was
subject to dl1mlasal1 or that the statute of llrnitltions for filing his petitton(s)

for post-conviction relief could possibl\' have begun running, at least untH
after his receipt of the State•s November 24. 2008 Respondent's Brief; and
(86)

Even then, I do not see how Mr. Sch~ttz MRonably could be expected to
have knOWn that his consolidated direct appeal was subject to dismissal,
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I
I

my initial Impressions concerning the timeliness of Mr. Sch~ltZ's notice of

appeal were completely off-base. l realized that, in the unJue situation. of

a "rider," Ille lime to appeal Jlwn the judgment ol

~ begins to ""'

·[w]hen the court releases its retained juriadictiOn or place, the defendant
on proba~n" and, thus, the queation of whether th~re i& a final,
appealable order within the meaning of Rule 11(c) is irretev.nt;
(42)

While I was abt. to make a colorable argument (in Mr. Schultz'&

AppeRant's Reply Brief, filed February 11, 2009, and , oral argument
before the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2009) that the oral pronouncement

and "temporary" order in Mr. Schultz's case was insufficie~t to •ptaoe( 1the

defendanl on p;ui)aiion' wllhin the meaning 0H'1u1e 14(r), I n,cognizm
that this was a far weaker argument than I originaUy

thl

ght I would be

able to make if the State raise~ the issue of the timeline~ of Mr. Schultz'&

appeal;
(43)

/

In light of my new, more~informed analysis of the iGsue of/the timeline&S of

Mr. SChultl's

IIQlice of

appeal, I prompt!-/ Informed ,,. Schultz of Iha

posslbiUty that his appeat mig~t be dismissed; however, 11initially failed to
advise him to file his post-conviction petition(s) lmme1iately (instead, I

continued to advise him, consistent with conventional wlrtom, to wait untn
his direct appeal had concluded). On February 11. 2

9, the same date

that I filed Mr. Schultz's Appellant's Reply Brief. I wrote t him as follow8:

My reco!lection is that when 1originally reViewed our case, I
noticed that the notice of appeal was not timely
the
district court's temporary order placing you on p11 batton. but
!f1ia8 filed 42 days Elfter the district court's formal rder was

,/
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or that the statute of timitations for filing his petitton(s) for p st-conviction
relief could possibly be rua,nlng, until after March 5, 2009, the date on

which I told Mr. Schultz that I believed that his appeal wa likely to be
dismissed, revealed the possibility that the one-year statute of limitations
may begin running (or may be deemed to have begun run ing already),

and recommended that Mr. Schultz file his post-conviction petition(s) as

soon as possible.

ERIK R. LEH
Deputy State Appellate P blic Defender
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 21 11 day of

2010.
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Thl THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi FIFTH ruDICIAL DI TRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF 1INIDOKA
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,

Case No. CV~201 -96

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

NOTICE OF
NT TO
DISMISS POST CONVICTION
APPLICATION ND ORDER
VACATING HE
G

Respondent.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz'')

found guilty after

trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005- 139. He pled guilty

to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County case CR- 005-884. 1
On January 13, 2009, Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction c
case CV-2009-47, regarding the drug possession case, CR-2005-884.

Minidoka. County
n March 24, 2009,

Mr. Schultz filed a post-conviction case, Minidoka County case CV- 009-221, regarding
the domestic battery case, CR-2005-1139. He received appointed co

el in both cases.

I A more detailed procedural history is contained in the court's prior Notice or Intent
Conviction Application, entered September 5, 2013.
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The State filed motions to dismiss both post-conviction peti ·ons, arguing that
they had been filed outside the one-year statute of limitations provi

in Idaho Code §

19-4902(a). On January 8, 2010, the court granted the State's mo ·ons. Mr. Schultz
appealed. On May 9, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed th dismissal of Mr.
Schultz's post-conviction petitions. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 83, 256 P.3d 791
(Ct.App.2011).
On Januaiy 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-co viction petition in
this case. On November 6, 2013, he filed the Second Verified

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Succe sive Petition").
The court hereby gives notice to the parties of its intent to dis · s Mr. Schultz's
Second Am.ended Successive Petition.

DISCUSSION
When a court is satisfied that a post-conviction applicant "is n t entitled to postconviction relief and no pwpose would be served by any further

ceedings, it may

indicate to the parties its intention t.o clismiss the application and its re ans for so doing."
LC. § 19-4906(b). The court intends to dismiss Mr. Schultz's

econd Amended

Successive Petition because the ineffective assistance of counsel

conviction proceeding is not a "sufficient reason" for filing a successiv petition for postconviction relief. lvlr. Schultz's Second Amended Successive Petition s barred by Idaho

Code§ 19-4908.

In the Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz
ineffective assistance of· counsel regarding David Pena (hereafter
attorney in the underlying criminal cases. Although this claim was alle

dly raised in his
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original post-conviction petitions, Mr. Schultz contends that he is

'tted to raise this

claim regarding Mr. Pena in the Second Am.ended Successive P titian because he
received ineffective assistance from Clayne Zollinger, his attorney ·
• •
conVIction
cases.2

Idaho Code§ 19-4908 provides:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this a must be
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application.
y ground
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, vol tarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the co viction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to s cure relief
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unle the court
fmds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reas n was not
asserted or was inadequately raised in the original, suppl ental, or
amended application.
·
(Emphasis added.)
Earlier case law provided that the ineffective assistance of pri r post-conviction
counsel could provide sufficient reason to perm.it an applicant for post- nviction relief to
file a successive petition and assert grounds for relief that were adjudi ted or waived in
proceeding. See Palmer v. Dennitt,
the prior post-conviction
.
. 102 Idaho 591, 595-96, 635
P.2d 955, 959-60 (1981); Griffin v. State, 142 Idaho 438, 441, 1 8 P.3d 975, 978
(Ct.App.2006); Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 798, 992 P.2d 789, 793
(Ct.App.1999); Wolfe v. State, 113 Idaho 337, 339, 743 P.2d 990, 9 2 (Ct.App.1987).

However, the Idaho Supreme Court recently held that because

post-conviction

petitioner "has no statutory ·or constitutional right to effective· as 'stance of postconviction counsel, [he or] she cannot demonstrate 'sufficient re on' for filing a.

2
1n the Second Amended Successive Petltion, Mr. Schultz also attempts to rais a claim of newly
discovered evidence. However, this claim was dismissed .in the court's Order Reg · g the Court's Notice
9f l~ent to Dismiss and the Petitioner's Motion to Amend Successive Petition fur Po t-Conviction Relict
entered October 3J.2013. Since this claim has been dismissed, the court will not a
s it at this time.

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS POST-CONVICDON APPUCATION AND ORDER VA
CV-2011-96

:ATING HEAR1NO

Page 3

87 of 109

88 of 109

successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel "Murphy v. State,
No. 40483, 2014 WL 712695, at *6 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014).

4
I

The only cited basis for allowing the successive petition

this case is the

ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Because this

ii not a "sufficient

reason" for filing a successive petition, Mr. Schultz's claim of ineffc

·ve assistance of

counsel regardm.g Mr. Pena in the Second Amended Successive Pe· tion is barred by
Idaho Code § 19-4908.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court is satisfied that Mr.
Schultz is not entitled to post-conviction relief and that there would be o purpose served
by further proceedings. The court gives notice that it intends to dis ·ss Mr. Schultz's
Second Amended Successive Petition. Mr. Schultz has tvl•enty (20)

dars to reply as set
I

forth in Idaho Code§ 19-4906(b).

In light of the court's intent to dismiss this case. the State's Mo ·on for Summary
Dismissal, filed December 12, 2013, may be moot. Therefore, the he
21, 2014 regarding tbe State's motion is hereby vacated.
f<.
It is so ORDERED this 2 r_day of February, 201 ..

g set for March

------t-""?I-------

MICHAELR.C
District Judge

NOTICE OF INT6NT TO DISMISS POST.CONVICTION APPLICATION AND ORDER V
CY -2011 ·96

I

ATING HEARING
Page 4

88 of 109

89 of 109

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

8,1

of

i ,t,wa'::\ ,201

, I served a true,
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AND ORDER VACATING HEARING on the following in the manner pr .vided:
Lance Stevenson
Minidoka County Prosecutor
Steven R. McRae
P. 0. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
Wally Kay Schultz
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CASE#_~

Steven R. McRae {ISB No. 7984]
McRAE LAW OFFICE. PLLC
161 5lh Ave. South, Ste. 100
P.O. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233
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C

Telephone No. (208) 944-0755
Facsimile No. (208) 736-0041
·e-mail: SMcRae@MagicVallcyLegal.com
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF fIHE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUN'IY OF

WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,
Petitioner,

vs. .

')
)
)
)

)

. STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

MINID01

Case No. CR-2011-96
PETITIONER'S REP Y TO NOTICE
OF INTENT TO DIS SS

)
)
)
)

COMES NOW, Petitioner, Wally Kay Schultz, by and through

hif attorney of record,· ·

Steven R. McRae of McRae Law Office, PLLC, and files this Reply to~ Court's Notice of ·

Intent to Dismiss as filed on February 27, 2014 (the "Notice oflntent").

~ the Notice of'l~terit,

·.

·.

·the Court sets forth reasoning to dismiss Petitioner's Second Verified iAmended Successive:

· · Petition/or Post Conviction Reliefas filed on November 6, 2013(the "Petitibn").
Herein, Petitioner sets forth why his claims must be allowed

tol proceed.

Petitioner

. ·asserts herein that despite recent Idaho case law, Petitioner claims that he' a right to effective·

• ,asoistaru:e of counsel upon his mitial. collatffll lfflCW procecdiPg (4tioncr's ~itial pOSI·
conviction proceeding) under federal law.

Petitioner seeks this Co$ to
I

dkect that

the
.
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proceedings should continue in this matter pursuant'to Idaho Code § 19-4906(h). Petiti~ner

seeks oral argument on this matter.
DISCUSSION
At issue in the present matter is whether Petitioner can claim an ineffective assistance of
counsel argument on Clayne Zollinger ("Zollinger,,), the attorney who represented Petitioner in
his original post-conviction petitions in Minidoka County Case No. CV-2009-0000047 (as it
related to CR;.2005-0000884) and CV-2009-0000221 (as it related to CR-2005-II39)
(collectively the "Prior Petitions"). See the Petition at 2-4. This Court now cites the recent

decision of the Idaho Supreme Court of Alisha Ann Murphy v. State of Idaho, filed February 25,
2014. Docket No. 40483 as authority to dismiss Petitioner's present Petition. Petitioner has
expressly relied upon Palmer v. Dermilt, 102 Idaho 591 (See the Petition at 2-4). And, in
Murphy, the Idaho Supreme Court expressly overrules Palmer. See Murphy at 8. However, as is

set forth herein, Petitioner asserts that he can continue to claim ineffective assistance of counsel
in his initial collateral review proceeding (the Prior Petition) under recent decisions by the

United States Supreme Court and under federal law.
Petitioner first acknowledges the rulings of the United States Supreme Court that hold
"[T]here ii no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." See

Coleman

11.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 725 (1991) and Pennsylvania v. Finley. 481 U.S. 551

(1987). The Idaho Supreme Court was relying on this rule when it decided the Murphy decision;
in fact. the Idaho Supreme Court cited Pennsylvania v. Finley in its decision in Murphy. Murphy
at 7.

However, in Martinez v. Ryan,_ U.S._, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the United States
Supreme Court ruled a new exception to Coleman and Finley that "inadequate assistance of
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counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural
default of a claim ... " The Court limited its ruling in Martinez (that a petitioner can rely upon
the argument that counsel was ineffective upon an initial review collateral proceeding to seek

relief) to stat.es which provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial
in the collateral proceeding. Id. at 1316 (2012). The Court explains:

Coleman v. Thompson ... left open. and the Court of Appeals in this case
addressed,, a question of constitutional law: whether a prisoner has a right
to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which provide the first
occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial." Id. These
proceedings can be called, for purposes of this opinion, "initial-review
collateral proceedings. Colema11 Juul surgested, though without holding,
t/,111 the Co111tlhltio• may re9llitt States to proville counsel in initial~
rnicw collatmwl prt)Ct.edlnfl b«a1111. 'in /tieM} .•. stat, .co/ltlw4l
l'llWW 11· the jlnt pltu:e " prisoner can pn.telll a chalkltre 'IO his
conviction." [Citation omitted]. As Coleman noted. this makes the
initial-review collateral proceeding a prisoner's 'one and only' appeal as
to the ineffective-assistance claim [citation omitted], and this may justify
an exception to. the constitutional rule that there is no right to counsel in
collateral proceedings.

Id. (emphasis added). The Court reasoned, in application to Arizona's laws. "the initial-review
collateral proceeding is the firs.t designated proceeding for a prisoner to raise a claim of

ineffective assistance at trial, the collateral proceeding is in many ways equivalent of a prisoner's
direct appeal as the incffi:ctivc-assistance claim." Id. at 1317 (2012). Furthermore, the Court
recognized that ''a prisoner's inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern

when the dabn is one of ineffective assistance of counsel. The right to the effective assistance of
counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system:' Id.
And, of particular import, the Court further recognized, ''In.effectlve•tusistance /of trial

coUMtd} clt1ima often depend on evltlen.ce outside the triffl record. Direct appeals, witl1out
e,,identiary hearings, may ,wt be as effective as other proceedings for developil'lg die factual

basis for the claim. u Id. at 1318. (Emphasis added). As such, the Court held that Martinez
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could assert die ineffective assistance of his initi.al~revicw collateral proceeding attorney because
his collateral proceeding was the first occasion that Martinez was able to raise his claim of

ineffective assistance at trial. Id. at 1320.
Following the Martina decision, the United States Supreme Court further considered
when a pOSt-conviction petitioner can claim ineffective assistance of counsel upon an initialreview collateral proceediog in Trevin~ v. Thaler, _

U.S. _ , 133 S.Ct. 191 l (2013). In

Tl'evlno. the Court looked at Texas's laws, whlch by design and opeJ.'lltion. makes it unlikely in a
typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise an ineffective-assistance
of trial counsel claim on direct appeal. Id. at 1913 (2013). The Court oonsidel'Cd that while
Texas laws do allow for ineffective assistance of trial counsel OP direct review, they do not allow
procedures to adequately develop the record. Id. As such. the Court held that even though Texas

laws allowed for ineffective assistance of trial claims on direct appeal. that the post-conviction

was the best way in Texas to develop this argument. Id. at 1913-14 (2013). As such, the Court
ruled that Trevino could brioa an ineffective assistance of counsel clairn on his attorney in his
initial-review· collateral proceedina for failing to properly bring an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim on his trial counsel. Id. The Court ruled:

The right iuvolvcd - adequate assistance of trial counsel - is similarly and
critically important. In both instaces practical consideration, - the
M«l/or 1111sw lt,wyu, the neetl to ,xp,1111/ tl11 trlfll com NCOttl, """ the
IIMI for 111f/kiellt tl111e to deNlop the claim - "'I• lt,ongly for illitlal
consideration of the claim d"riffK a collateral, not II ditttt, rnMw. See
Martinez, 566 U.S., at--' 132 S.Ct., at_. In both instances failure to
consider a lawyers "ineffectiveness.. during an initial-review collateral

proceeding as potential "cause" for excusing a procedural default will
deprive the defendant of any opportunity for nwiew of an ineffeetiveassistance-of-trial counsel claim. [Citation omitted].

Id. (Emphasis added).
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In application to Idaho law. Petidoner recognius that generally, he bas the right to claim

ineffective assistance of his trial counsel on direct appeal. However. Idaho case law bas
established the procedural concerns that have been expressed in TreYlno, which makes the
analysis and ruling in Trevino applicable to Idaho. In State v. Saxton. the Idaho Court of appeals

explains making an ineffective assistance of trial counsel argument on direct appeal in stating:
The presentation of Saxton's ineffective assistance claims compels this Court
to once again mtera• tut It i.t ,ulldy mfl/lPl'O/lrltdl to n,ise 111cl, a m,
on " dinct .,,.,i from 11,e )lltlgment of conviction. T/tls Is so 6ecatde
CM""6 o/ llll!Jfdve " " ~ re,lllarly ndu i.rl11a on whlcl, M ev/tlaau
was pNH11ted Id the defMllant's trltd. Beet,,. t1,, competMcy of countel
l.t not an lau bl a cl'lntllull trial, the trlol record OIi dlNCt fl/lPMI is !!!l'.!11,
..._,. for rwiew of s.eh clailfl.t. As Justice Bakes stated in Carter v.
State. 108 Idaho 788. 702 P.2d 826 (1985): TN qllUll011 of COIIIJ}dalcy of
0011111-1 II an OirelMly COIIIJJ/u factl#ll tldermilllltilla wllldr, in gll but t/,f
NB RPM( tmn. ,eq,dro a tmtlD,llruy ,,.,,,,,, btfor, 4-rlllinatlon.
11w n,olldlM of ti,,,. fllCt#al i.tsMG for tl,e ./hi dlM llpOII appeal, baN
IIJIM II trit,1 IWO'lll bt wl,kl, CO'llfl*nce of co,11,s,J was not at la~, la at
llat conjedluYIL

If an appellate court were to reach the merits of ineffective assistance issues
nused on a direct appealt the absence of any record supporting the claims
would perally require a decision adverse to ~he appellant, which would

become re, Judicato. Coa~w,,tly, we CllffOllltll'l/y dedln, to lllldnn sud,
tu judp,ellt of con'Pit:tlon. Md we h•N r,peatt#lly
tld,,,.1§11«1 tlurt IA,y are 11111N IIJJJROPrllltely plll'Sued tl,l'Ough postco"'1lctlon relief actlt,u, w.vre tit, nl*ntltl,y record car, 6e propmy
ds,dtJpeil. (Numerous citations omitted).

cll,IMs 011 app«Jl from

State v. Saxton. 133 Idaho S46, 549. 989 P.2d 288,291 (Idaho App. 1999).

This language in Saxton shows the same concems for arguing an ineffective assistance of
counsel daun on direct appeal in Idaho that are present under Texas law in Trevino. Namely, the
Idaho Court of Appeal stat.es that such a clain1 on dm:ct appeal would not have sufficient factnal
inquiry (i.e.• there would be "the ll#d to apt111tl the trltll mun r«or4''. See Trevino at 1913-14
(2013)) and directly states that most claims are "more appropriately pursued through post-

conviction relief actions ••. " As such. because claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are
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mo~ appropriately brought in post-conviction claims, under Trevino. a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel on an initial collateral review proceeding (i.e.. an initial post-conviction

proceeding) raises Sixth Amendment concerns of ineffective assistance of that collateral revrew

proceeding eoun11l.

In tho present matter. Petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance of his initial collateral
review proceeding attorney, Zollinger. He is claiming that Zollinger failed to assert the claims as
set forth in the Petition - specifically, that he failed to adeqmtely pursue Petitioner's claim of

ineffective aasistance of Petitioner's trial counsel, David Pena. Under Saxton, Petitioner's claim
against his 1rial attorney would have most appropriately been brought in bis original post-

conviction proceeding in contrast to seeking it on appeal. Petitioner now asserts that because his
claim for ineffective assistance of his trial counsel

was not appmpriate in his direct appeal

(because Petitioner would not have had a sufficient record to establish the claim on direct appeal.
he would not have had sufficient Opportunity to establish his claim, and such a claim would most

likely have been denied under Saxton), Petitioner's claim in his original post-conviction
proceeding was needed. and Petitioner was guaranteed effective assistance of counsel in tho
same pursuant to Trevino. As suoh, Petitioner continues to assert his claim in his Petition.
Finally, Petitioner notes that the Court's decision - based upon Mwphy - is that
ineffectiw assistance of prior post-conviction coumol is not sufficient ieason under Idaho Ca,sk

§ 19-4908 for allowing a succesmve petition. Petitioner asserts pursuant to the above analysis
that he was entitled to effective wistancc of counsel at his initial collateral review proceeding
from Zollinger, which is a sufficient reason under Idaho Code § 19-4908 for allowing his present
(and successive) petition. .
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner requests that the Court, pursuant to Idaho Cgdc §
19-4906(b) direct that the proceedings continue. Additionally, Petitioner requests an oral hearing
on this matter for all issues raised.
DATED this 11t11 day of March. 2014.

McRAE LAW OFFICE, PLLC

By,~h----Stei:McRae
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Steven R. McRae, a resident attorney of the State of Idaho, hereby certifies that on the
11th day of March. 2014, he served a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document
upon the following:

Lance Stevenson
Prosecuting Att.omcy for
the County of Minidoka
P.O. Box368

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ X ]

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand-Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

Rupert, ID 833SO

Steven R. McRae
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFI'H JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,

Case No.CV-2011-96

ORDER DISMISSING POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION

Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz (hereafter "Mr. Schultz'') was found guilty after

trial of felony domestic battery in Minidoka County case CR-2005-1139. He pied guilty
to possession of a controlled substance in Minidoka County case CR-2005-884.
On January 13 and March 24, 2009, Mr. Schultz filedpost-convictionpeti1ions in
Minidoka County cases CV-2009-47 and CV-2009-221. He received appointed counsel

in both cases. The State filed motions to dismiss both post-conviction petitions. The court
granted the State's motions, and Mr. Schultz appealed. The Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Schultz's post-conviction petitions. See Schultz v. State,
151 ldaho 383,256 P.3d 791 (Ct.App.2011).
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On January 21, 2011, Mr. Schultz filed the successive post-conviction petition in

this case. On November 6, 2013, he filed the Second Verified Amended Successive
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (hereafter "Second Amended Successive Petition.,.,).
The court entered a Notice of Intent to Dismiss Post-Conviction Application on Febntary
27, 2014. Mr. Schultz filed a reply on March 11, 2014. After a hearing on April 7, 2014,
the court took the matter imder advisement.

DISCUSSION

In the Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz asserts a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel regarding David Pena (hereafter "Mr. Pena"), his
attorney in the underlying criminal cases. 1 Although. this claim was allegedly raised in the
original post-conviction petitions, Mr. Schultz contends that he is permitted to raise it in
the Second Amended Successive Petition because he received ineffective assistance from
Clayne Zollinger, his attorney in the original post-conviction cases.

With regard to subsequent applications for post-conviction relief, Idaho Code §
19-4908 provides:

All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this act must be
raised in his original, supplemental or amended application. Any ground
finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly, volwrtarily and
intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in the conviction or
sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief
may not be the basis for a subsequent application, wtless the court
finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not
asspted or was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or
amended application.

1 In t.l1e Second Amended Successive Petition, Mr. Schultz also attempted to raise a. claim of newly
discovered evidence. However, thls claim was dismissed in 1he court's October 31, 2013 order regarding
an earlier notice of intent to dismiss. Therefore, the court will not address thi, y!aim 'at this time.
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I.C. § 19-4908 (emphasis added.) The Idaho Supreme Court recently held that because a
post-conviction petitioner "has no statutory or constitutional right to effective assistance

of post-conviction counsel, [he or) she cannot demonstrate 'sufficient reason' for filing a
successive petition based on ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel.'' Murphy v. State,

No. 40483, 2014 WL 712695, at "'6 (Idaho Feb. 25, 2014).
The only basis cited for allowing the successive petition in this case is the alleged
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel. Under lmtrphy, this is not a

"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition. Therefore, the claims raised in Mr.
Schultz's Second Amended Successive Petition regarding Ivfr. Pena are barred by Idaho

Code § 19-4908.
Despite the holding in Murphy, Mr. Schultz contends that the ineffective
assistance of prior post~conviction counsel is a "suffi.ci.ent reason" for ftling a successive
petition. He contends that he was entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his

original post-conviction cases because those cases were initial-review collateral

proceedings. In support of this argument, Mr. Schultz relies on Martinez v. Ryan, - U.S.
"·-, 132 S.Ct. 1309 {2012) and Trevino v. Thaler, -- U.S. ---. 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013). ·
The United States Supreme Court has held that there is "no constitutional right to
an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings." Coleman v. Thompson) 501 U.S. 722,

752, 111 S.Ct. 2546~ 2566 (1991). In .1.vfartinez and Trevino, the United States Supreme
Court did not hold that a petitioner has a constitutional right to the effective assistance of

counsel in a state post-conviction case. Instead, those cases address a narrow issue:
"whether ineffective assistance in an initial-review collateral proceeding on a claim of
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ineffective assistance at trial may provide cause for a procedural default in a federal

habeas proceeding." },,fartinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1315 (emphasis added).
Generally. "any attorney error that led to the default of [a petitioner's] claims in
state oourt cannot constitute cause to excuse the default in federal habeas." Coleman. 501
U.S. at 757, 111 S.Ct. at 2568. In Martinez, the United States Supreme Court recognized

a narrow exception to this general rule, holding:
Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel
must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural
default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial
claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral
proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was
ineffective.
132 S.Ct. at 1320 (emphasis added). In Martinez, the Arizona law at issue required
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims to be raised in a state collateral proceeding
and not on direct appeal. 132 S.Ct. at 1314. In Trevino, the United States Supreme Court
el..'Pan.ded the Martinez holding to apply to cases in which applicable state law grants
permission to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims on direct appeal but, "as
a matter of procedural design and systemic operation, denies a meaningful opportunity to

.

.

do so." 133 S.Ct. at 1921.

Ali set forth above, Martinez and Trevino do not establish that a petitioner has a
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in a state post-conviction case.

Rather, these cases address a narrow issue regarding procedural default in federal habeas
proceedings. This is not a federal habeas proceeding. Therefore, the cases upon which

Mr. Schultz has relied have no bearing on Idaho Code§ 19-4908 and the application of
the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy to this case.
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.•
Based on the foregoing considerations and analysis, the court is satisfied that Mr.
Schultz is not entitled to post:.Conviction'relief and that there would be no purpose served

by further proceedings. The court..h~by dismisses Mt. Schultz's Second Amended
Successive Petition~ its entirety. piir~t to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b).
·

It is so ORDERED this _f_ day of April, 201.Qc:====----=:::::::=-?"'7'""---::~-~

MICHAEL R. CRABTREE
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _j__ of

,4-p&:1

, 2014, I served a true,

correct copy of the ORDER DISMISSING POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION on the
following in the manner provided:
Lance Stevenson
Minidoka County Prosecutor
Steven R. McRae
P. 0. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233

~Email

(f.) Email

Wally Kay Schultz
212 6th Ave. West
Jerome, ID 83338

CA Mail

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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FILED-DISTRICT COURT
CASE#
..~:-TIME_ ---:7\\:-::
0-N,\Jl--

APR

9 2014

IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIB FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,

Case No. CV-2011-96

JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
Judgment is entered in favor of the Respondent State of Idaho and against the
Petitioner Wally Kay Schultz. The petition for post-conviction relief in the above~entitled
case is dismissed in its entirety.

~

DATED this .2_ day of April, 2014.

u:¥Z;·

?vfICHAELR.CRABTREE
District Judge

RIGHT TO APPEAL/LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The Right The court hereby advises the Petitioner of the right to appeal this
Judgment within forty two (42) days of the date it is file stamped by the clerk of the court

I.AR. 14(a).
In Form.a Pauperis: The court further advises the Petitioner of the right of a person
who is unable to pay the costs of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in fonna pauperis,
meaning the right as an indigent to proceed without liability for court costs and fees and
the right to be represented by a court appointed attorney at no cost to the Petitioner.

JUDGMENT
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

-1-- of

ttp.AA}

, 2014, I served a true,

correct copy of the JUDGMENT on the following in the manner provided:
Lance Stevenson
Minidoka County Prosecutor

(~ Email

Steven R. McRae
P. 0. Box 1233
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1233

¥-) Email

Wally Kay Schultz
212 6th Ave. West
Jerome, ID 83338

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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To: Lawrence G. Wasden
State Attorney General
PO Box83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Sara Thomas
State Appellate Public Defender
3050 Lake Harbor Ln. Ste. 100
Boise, ID 83703
Supreme Court Docket No. 42095
Minidoka County Case No. CR2011-96
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Vs.
Wally K Schultz,
Defendant/Appellant.
NOTICE OF FILING OF CLERK'S RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT ON CD
Notice is hereby given that one complete copy of the Limited CLERK'S RECORD is

Being sent to Counsels' of record. Be advised of the twenty-eight (28) day settlement period as
Required by IAR 29. Please file any objection to the record and transcript, including any requests for
corrections, deletions or additions with the District Court, together with a Notice of Hearing.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court in Rupert,
Idaho, the

J.';}.,J.._ day of

Me, ,2014.
Patty Temple
Clerk of the District Court

By:d~7YJr4{
Deputy Clerk
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

'

);;,

JvL_

day of

~<

,

2014, I mailed a true,

correct copy of the foregoing document to be served by U.S. first-class mail, postage pre-

paid, upon the following unless a different method of service is indicated:

Lawrence G. Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Po Box83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Sara Thomas
STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
3050 Lake Harbor Lane, Ste. 100
Boise, ID 83707
SUPREME COURT
COURT OF APPEALS
PO Box83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

********
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Wally Kay Schultz
Defendant/Appellant.

Supreme Court No. 42095-2014
District Court No. CR-2011-96
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
SERVICE

I, Laurie McCall, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that I have personally served
or mailed by United States Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the
parties or their attorney of record as follows:
Lawrence Wasden, Esq.
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

Sara Thomas
STATE APPELLATE PD
3050 Lake Harbor Lane Ste. 100
Boise, ID 83 707

IN WITNESS WHEREq!', I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said
Court in Rupert, Idaho, the ;J?;IVC..... day of May, 2014.
PATTY TEMPLE
Clerk of the District Court

By:~frl~

auneMcCall, Deputy Clerk

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

* * * * * *
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

Wally Kay Schultz,

Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 42095

District Court# CR-2011-96

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO
RECORD

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Minidoka )
I, Patty Temple, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above-entitled case was compiled and bound under my direction, and is a true
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule
28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY that the Notice of Appeal was filed on the 23rd day of April,
2014.

Clerk of the District Court

By:

····~in,~
LaurieMcall,Deputy Cleik

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE TO RECORD
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 42095
DIST. CT. CASE NO. CR-2011-96

vs.

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
RE: EXHIBITS

Wally Kay Schultz,
Defendant/Appellant,
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss.
County of Minidoka )
I, PATTY TEMPLE, Clerk of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Minidoka, do hereby certify that I am sending the following exhibit:
None.

That the Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of the record on appeal in the aboveentitled cause and are being sent to the Clerk of the Supreme Court with the Clerk's Record on
Appeal, as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at

Rupert, Idaho, this

r?rJ...day of ~

, 2014.
PATTY TEMPLE
Clerk of the District Court (SEAL)

By:La~g;~rk

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK RE: EXHIBITS
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05-22-2014

FILED-DISTRICT COURT
CASE #
TIME ----:(:-=-:-t/5---p-/l'\-

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
1.S.B. #5867

,

MAR 2 2 2014

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
1.S.B. #6247
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703

PATTY TEMPLE, CLER K

c:/c= ,DEPUTY

(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR MINIDOKA COUNTY
WALLY KAY SCHULTZ,

)

l

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

)

l

STATE OF IDAHO,
Re11pondent.

CASE NO. CV 2011-96
S.C. DOCKET NO. 42095
AMENDED
NOTICE OF APPEAL

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND
THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, LANCE D. STEVENSON, MINIDOKA
COUN
PROSECUTOR, 715 G STREET, P.O. BOX 368, RUPERT, ID, 83350, AND TY
THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1.

The

above-named

appellant

appeals

against the

above-named

respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Dismissing
Post
Conviction Application and Judgment entered in the above-entitled action
on the

9th day of April, 2014, the Honorable Michael R. Crabtree, presiding.

2. ·

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable
orders
under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a), I.AR.
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3.

05-22-2014

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then

intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other Issues on appeal, is/are:
(a)

Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's Petition for

Post Conviction Relief?

4.

There is a portion of the record that is sealed. That portion of the record

that Is sealed is the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSI).
5.

Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the

entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R. 25(c). The appellant
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's
transcript:
(a}

Motion

Hearing

Maureen Newton.

no

held on October 28, 2013 (Court Reporter:

estimation of pages was listed on the Beaister of

Actions); and
(b)

Motion Hearing held on April 7, 2014 (Court Reporter: Maureen

Newton. no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of Actions).
6.

Clerk's Record.

The appellant requests the standard clerk's record

pursuant to I.AR. 28(b)(2}. The appellant requests the following documents to
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under

IA.R. 28(b)(2):
(a)

Petitioner's Response to Respondent's Motion for Summary

Judgment flied January 2, 2014;

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL • Page 2
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{b)

Reply to Petitioners

Response

05-22-2014

to State's Motion for Summary

Dismissal filed January 7, 2014;
(c)

Stipulation to Vacate Hearing filed January 10, 2014;

(d)

Petitioners Response to Respondent's Additional Basis

for

Summary Judgment filed January 29, 2014;
(e)

Petitioner's Reply to Notice of Intent to Dismiss filed March 11,

2014;and
{f)

Any

exhibits.

affidavits,

objections,

responses,

briefs

or

memorandums, including all attachments or copies of transcripts, filed or

lodged, by the state, ·the appellate, or the court in support of, or in
opposition to, the dismissal of the Post-Conviction Petition.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on
the Court Reporter, Maureen Newton;

(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee fer the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho
Code§§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, Idaho Code§ 19-4904, I.AR. 24(4));

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a post
conviction case (Idaho Code §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R.
23(a)(10));

(d)

That arrangements have been made with Minidoka County who will
be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client

is indigent, I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(h);
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(e)

05-22-2014

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to I.A.R 20.

DATED this 22nd day of May, 2014.

~

~
ERIK R. LEHTINEN

Chief, Appellate Unit
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05-22-2014

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 22nd day of May, 2014, caused a true
and correct copy of the attached AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed
in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
STEVEN MCRAE
MCRAE LAW OFFICE PLLC
121 3RD AVENUE EAST
JEROME ID 83338
MAUREEN NEwrON
COURT REPORTER
PO B0X368
RUPERT ID 83350
LANCE D STEVENSON
MINIDOKA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
715 G STREET
P0BOX368
RUPERT ID 83350
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 03720-0010

Hand delivered to Attomey General's mailbox at Supreme Court

EVAN SMITH

Administrative Assistant

L..I <LJD'n1',ell.8
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